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Colonel Assimi Goïta was appointed Transitional President on 7 June 2021, after he had “excluded from their prerogatives” two weeks ago, on 25 May 2021, retired Colonels Bah N’Daw and Moctar Ouane, who served as President and Prime Minister respectively. 3 years later, the new Goïta-Maïga team has made significant progress, but also some shortcomings. Although the transition period is expected to be extended for several months, we review the results of the rectification and the outlook for the future.
The third year of the transition begins with the beginning of a possible rupture between strategic allies since the May 2021 reorganization: the former soldiers of the CNSP and the M5-RFP. This could become a major turning point in the new year that she begins. This movement close to the Prime Minister tends to publish on May 24 a rather critical memorandum on the management of the army over the past 12 months. The signatory of the memorandum, Jorgel Karamoko Traoré, the interim president of the M5 faction, was arrested a few days later at the Prime Minister’s office. On May 28, he was issued an arrest warrant for contempt of court, damage to the credibility of the State and dissemination of false statements by third parties. His sentencing is scheduled for 1yes July. This arrest is the second of a person very close to the Prime Minister after Abdelkader Mejia and is also a “consent” to the M5 tendency led by Imam Oumarou Diarra and Muntaga Tal, illustrating the tensions between the military and the Prime Minister. The memorandum condemned the violation of the agreement on the 1styes In July 2023, during a ministerial reshuffle, M5-RFP ministers were expelled from the government “without consultation or advice to Dr. Choguel K. Maïga, who holds the dual capacity of Prime Minister and Chairman of the M5-RFP.”
For political scientist Dr. Bréhima Mamadou Koné, a possible break between the M5 and the military will not have any impact on the rest of the transition, since “the M5 is overrated and, in fact, today it is an empty shell, without content”.
If 3th As relations between the May Movement-RFP branch loyal to the Prime Minister and the transitional military authorities deteriorated significantly, the year of rectification began, and like the previous two years, it would see several major events.
Third Year Continuity
After ending Operation Barkhane, turning their backs on France, a series of diplomatic spats between the two countries, and announcing Mali’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, the transitional authorities remain in the fractured dynamics that have characterized the second coup in May 2021.
On June 16, 2023, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Abdoulaye Diop asked the UN Security Council to withdraw MINUSMA immediately, accusing the UN mission of exacerbating communal tensions in Mali and aggravating the problems in Mali. Allegations and arguing that MINUSMA has not achieved its fundamental objectives. This request will be approved by the Security Council in two weeks, and the Council will decide on June 30, 2023 to end the UN mission’s mandate after 10 years of presence in the country. This withdrawal from MINUSMA takes effect from December 31, 2023, but the liquidation phase is still ongoing.
After the withdrawal of UN forces, the Malian army recaptured the various camps of the Mission and began to retake territory marked by the recovery of the city of Kidal on November 14, 2023. Two months later, on January 25, 2024, the Transitional Government announced the termination of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement resulting from the Algiers process, signed in 2015 with armed independence groups.
On September 16, 2023, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter to establish the Alliance of Sahel States, with the goal of establishing a collective defense and mutual assistance structure among the three countries, which will subsequently announce its withdrawal from ECOWAS on January 28, 2024.
On another level, the transition to 4 is something that previous presidents have long wanted but then always abandoned.th The Republic was proclaimed on July 22, 2023, with the Transitional President promulgating a new Constitution, which was widely accepted in a referendum on June 18, 2023.
“For me, the positive results of the third year of transition are limited to the successful recovery of Kidal. This is a real military and political victory, a powerful symbol and the highest achievement of a clearly demonstrated political will. But outside Kidal, everyone else feels a deep despair. This transition is carried out visually, without vision or perspective, we move forward by trying to communicate that conceals the real problems,” estimates Dr. Amidou Tidiani, teacher and researcher at Paris XIII University.
Comprehensive evaluation mixed
For those close to the Prime Minister, the transformative results of Mali’s reconstruction since the transition trajectory was corrected are “irrefutable, visible and tangible at every level”.
“This is a satisfactory result. When we look at the 5 main axes of the government’s action plan approved by the CNTL in August 2021, we see progress in almost all of them. Only on the axis of organizing the general elections can we somehow estimate that the transitional authorities have not succeeded,” said an aide to the prime minister. However, at his last appearance before the CNTL in April 2022, members of the transitional legislature were very critical of the prime minister. The CNTL has summoned him again, for an unknown date.
Dr. Amidou Tidiani, for his part, summarizes this assessment in four phases: the groping phase, the resistance phase, the military victory phase and the “disappointment with the political and economic management”. For him, the last step has brought “a great negative impact” on the overall outcome of the transition. “The opponents found themselves ill-treated. We tried to suppress any form of political opposition and to repress any opposing ideology. In addition, today our country is in a catastrophic state of public finances in the economy, deprived of any investment capacity and struggling to solve the energy crisis that has rocked the country,” lamented the academic. On April 10, the transitional authorities announced the suspension of political activities of political parties and associations until further notice.
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The Dialogue for Peace and National Reconciliation in Mali recommended extending the transition period from two to five years and made several other recommendations, some of which could become priorities for the continuation of the transition, depending on the decision of the highest authorities.
The organization of the presidential elections seems to have taken a back seat and for many, security issues must continue to be a priority during the transition period. “The priority remains to ensure security throughout the national territory. It is necessary to continue doing so until the country is stable, because despite the strengthening of the army’s combat capabilities in combat zones, the fight against terrorism is not easy,” stressed Dr. Brehima Mamadou Kone.
“Afterwards, it will be up to the authorities to decide whether to organize elections, if the security and socio-political environment permits and if they believe they can mobilize the necessary financial resources,” he continued.
Apart from the electoral issue, which does not seem to be a priority, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger will enter the post-ECOWAS period from January 2025. Exiting the subregional body could have a butterfly effect on the economic achievements of different countries and extend to currency issues, with the CFA franc often being a target.
However, for Dr. Tidiani, if the transition is to continue, a “change of personnel” is needed. “When we look at the transitional government today, we see that there is no one who is really capable of pulling the country out of the crisis. It is not the results of the past three years that are causing the problem, but the lack of prospects for the future,” the teacher and researcher said jokingly.
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