Thomein-DeBrum sold out compensation for Kwajalein survivors without getting any compensation for nuclear power or Kwajalein: Lose-lose outcomes from lose-lose leadership

In the American political system, when Congress is nearing the end of its term and the president is nearing the end of his term, it can be a good time to get certain things done because they are lower priority in the new Congress and the president has too many competing demands and priorities. This is especially true when Congress has a record to support action. Even in an election year, the last session of Congress before the end of its term is a time to address issues that are not important to the American election.

In S. 1756, the House and Senate had a good record of hearings on the RMI change of circumstances petition and nuclear claims. In the Senate, the RMI government successfully introduced the bill, held hearings, and Senate committee leadership agreed to approve it with amendments in favor of the RMI. If the bill had passed the Senate when committee leadership and staff told the RMI to prepare for action, it is possible that the Senate and the RMI would have worked together to get the House to act, and the Department of the Interior and OMB would not have strongly opposed the bill. This is how Bikini Island received $90 million in resettlement funds in 1987, when OMB decided not to oppose it.

Since the Senate introduced S. 1756 at the request of President Nott, when the Senate was ready to pass the bill in January, it needed to confirm the stability and continuity of the Marshall Islands government and that the new leadership would continue to support the bill. But Tony DeBlum was afraid that the Nott government might take credit for it, so he refused to answer the Senate’s questions, and in this case, silence meant the answer was “no,” just as clearly as the Marshall Islands saying “no” to the Senate. In addition, DeBlum did not want the Marshall Islands nuclear claims policy to succeed unless he first made the Kwajalein ruling class successful, and DeBlum’s demand was that the United States pay them more or withdraw. This juvenile delinquency strategy backfired.

Thus, S. 1756 remains in limbo, despite the testimony of the four atolls at a “hearing” in Broome for U.S. Congressman Eni Faleomavaega of American Samoa that the RMI must make S. 1756 a priority. The four atolls sent a letter and addressed the RMI asking the RMI to take swift and clear action in support of the bill, as this is not a transitional issue, and therefore it does not take a day or two to study it to understand that not speaking loudly and clearly to Congress “in support” would be a mistake.

The four atolls are a reminder to the Tomaine-de Brum administration that even if the bill doesn’t pass in full, the further it gets in this Congress, the more hope it has that it will be back on the agenda next year under a new Congress and a new president. But Tomaine-de Brum got so angry at the Marshall Islands ambassador, Benny de Brum, that he fired the ambassador and embassy staff before a new ambassador came in, so he didn’t maintain stability and continuity. Tomaine-de Brum mismanaged, and we can now estimate the price of his incompetence: $100 million.

Perhaps the bill could be reintroduced next year, but then it would be competing with many other issues that are a priority for a new Congress and a new president. In addition, funding for the RMI bill would have to come from somewhere in the budget, and raising money would be much more difficult in a new Congress that would have so many new budget priorities.

As predicted yesterday, now that the Marshall Islands government has stopped its silent opposition and secretive opposition behind the scenes, the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee placed S. 1756 on the agenda. The Committee approved S. 1756 with favorable amendments to increase additional funding for health from $2 million per year for the four islands to $4 million per year for the ten islands identified in the most recent U.S. government health study as affected by the U.S. nuclear testing program. Under S. 1756, the $4 million per year in health care funding would continue for 20 years and be adjusted upward annually for inflation.

Unfortunately, the late approval of S. 1756 by Congress is more like a death march than a celebration of a new beginning. Because S. 1756 did not pass, it is reported that $4 million that was supposed to be used for 20 years of health care will only be used for 1 year, and only $1 million will be used to benefit the 10 atolls, with no reliable promise of future funding.

The RMI had only to say “yes.” It could have been a one-sentence diplomatic note. Since no one on the mainland believed a word Tony DeBlum said, the note had to be in writing in order for it to be accepted by the United States and relied upon by Congress. But it could have accepted the $100 million package as additional compensation from the United States without giving up any past, present, or future claims for additional compensation in U.S. courts, in Congress, or through diplomatic channels. No one was asking the RMI to support and settle the claims or give up any claim that the U.S. compensation under the Section 177 agreement was inadequate. The RMI had only to say “yes,” $100 million more is better than nothing, which is good, but still not enough.

But that means the U.S. Senate will approve $100 million over 20 years for 10 atolls, but no more money for Imata Atoll. That’s why Tony DeBlum told his lobbyist, Mr. Johnston, not to consider S. 1756. Tony has used his position as Marshall Islands foreign minister to get more and more money for the ruling land barons of Imata Atoll and Kwajalein. As a senator for Kwajalein, he doesn’t want the nuclear claims compensation money to compete with the Kwajalein money. He doesn’t even want S. 1756 to go forward at the same time as the Marshall Islands’ demand that the U.S. pay more or leave Kwajalein.

The thing is, when you are a minister you have to act on behalf of the country. If you only want to be a senator for the place you were elected to, then you resign as a minister, or if you can’t treat everyone fairly and have no conflict of interest, you recuse yourself from an issue. Try to explain that to Tony. Yes, that’s right.

So Tony quietly killed S. 1756. He then used RMI money to pay his lobbyists $1 million that allegedly belonged to everyone to get more money for a few people. That included Imata Kabua and Tony!

As time passes and his chances of approval by the full Senate grow slimmer, and his chances of approval by the House grow slimmer, Tony returns to the scene of the crime and tries to play word games to deny that he did it.

He puts the blame on everyone but himself, even though he stopped anyone from taking control of the agenda and blocking the bill. Now he says one senator has voiced opposition, but apparently that did not stop the Marshall Islands from supporting the bill. He says the statement in the committee report on the bill that Bikini and Enewetak want could be used against the Marshall Islands to seek more funding in the future, but that could be removed from the report or easily changed to ensure it does not cause any problems in the future.

Tony deBrum vetoed S. 1756 because he sold out the victims of the nuclear plant for Kwajalein. Don’t be surprised if Tony is now so arrogant as to take credit for getting the bill through committee. Don’t be fooled. Yes, the committee acted because the Marshall Islands finally supported S. 1756. But it only shows that the Senate committee is ready to act and deliver on its promises.

We will never know how far this bill would have advanced if the Republic of the Marshall Islands had supported it when asked to say “yes” in January, but we do know that Tony DeBlum’s decision to support S. 1756 in September was too late!