What does the China-Russia alliance mean for the West?

Over the years, Beijing and Moscow have gradually built a global anti-American and anti-freedom front. They want to change not only the status of Ukraine and Taiwan, but also the current world order. Politico Magazine wrote.

As a result, Russia can continue to receive substantial—and possibly even more—aid from China, which can keep its economy afloat and enable it to sustain its war against Ukraine for many years.

However, Beijing and Moscow’s interests remain divergent on several fronts. China’s increased support for Russia would be risky for the country’s already crisis-ridden economy if the West expands sanctions on Russian banks and companies. In March and April, Chinese exports to Russia fell for the first time since mid-2022 compared with the same period last year, reflecting growing caution and payment problems facing Russian importers amid increasing U.S. pressure.

Regardless of how things play out, we should be skeptical of Beijing’s official rhetoric of pacifism. Russia’s long-standing and systematic support suggests that it is in the country’s interest to maintain the confrontation and reap economic and geopolitical benefits.

Finally, the war in Europe ties up Western resources and diverts Washington’s attention from Beijing’s activities in other parts of the world. Russia’s dependence on China is already high, and will only grow as Chinese companies replace Russia’s former Western trade and investment partners.

In fact, with every month of the war, China’s relative power against Russia grew. The growing production of weapons and ammunition in the Russian defense industry created a false growth that masked the actual economic decline, while the Chinese economy, although also affected by difficulties, continued to grow. China could also import Russian raw materials at low prices, while supplying the country with a large number of consumer goods.

Moreover, Moscow has gradually allowed the transfer of more of its latest military technology to China. Although Russia is not a pure vassal state, it has no choice but to meet Beijing’s growing demands – whether it is concessions on energy prices, China’s presence in Central Asia, or support for China’s hegemonic ambitions in South and East Asia.

At the same time, Beijing hopes that Moscow will neither completely win nor completely lose over Ukraine. A Russian victory, with China’s support, would strengthen Moscow but would also distance the West from Beijing. A Russian defeat would destabilize the Putin regime and could lead to its political transformation or even destruction. This in turn could lead to reduced Chinese access to cheap energy, the Russian market, the Arctic, and military technology secrets, and the loss of its most important partner in its long-term strategic competition with the United States.

Given these interests, China’s calls for peace should not be taken seriously. For more than a decade, Beijing has blatantly violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in support of Russia. It is commonly forgotten that China declared its respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders both in 1994 when Ukraine joined the NPT and in 2013 in the fully ratified Sino-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty. Yet, since 2014, Beijing’s apparent neutrality and its economic support for Moscow have been key to Russia’s radical revision of European countries’ borders.

Worse, as Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine continues to expand, Beijing has rhetorically backed up its apology narrative, which includes, for example, Moscow’s so-called “legitimate security concerns” and the Kremlin’s deliberate (mis)interpretation of the concept of “indivisible security” as a core component of its own foreign policy, Western responsibility for the war, tensions in Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific region.

It is noteworthy that Beijing’s support for Moscow has been significant despite the negative impact on its relations with the West and possible economic consequences. The country now faces increasing risks of a trade war with the United States.

Today, Beijing and Moscow project an image of a united, powerful, and stable anti-democratic and anti-American alliance that also includes notorious rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria. But the potential for cracks in this informal alliance is also evident. For example, Russia’s growing ties with a powerful North Korea, which Beijing has long struggled to control, could lead to a difficult threesome.

Last but not least, as Matthew Kroenig points out in his book The Return of Great Power Competition, we should not forget that authoritarian regimes suffer from instability in their external and internal relations. World history shows that open political systems with the rule of law and pluralism are more effective both domestically and in dealing with international conflicts with enemies and tensions with foreign allies.

In this context, it is very important that the West remains determined and united. In particular, this means that Ukraine will receive all the support it needs today. Ukraine’s victory on the battlefield and the restoration of its national territory with Western support are the best means of curbing Russian and Chinese revisionism.