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Argentina preparing for a new Falklands War? Maybe the U.S. can stop it
Miley has made his position clear, comparing it to Britain’s return of Hong Kong and insisting Argentina’s sovereignty over the islands is non-negotiable.
George Allison
Argentina’s recent moves to update and expand its military capabilities, including its desire to acquire amphibious assault ships and a deal with Denmark to buy retired F-16 fighter jets, have attracted attention. The 1982 Falklands War remains a defining event in the history of both Britain and Argentina.
For Britain, the conflict reaffirmed its sovereignty over the islands and demonstrated its military resolve; it showed that, despite its decline, Britain remained a first-rate military power and a force for good.
The defeat was a national trauma for Argentina, but it did not quench the desire to reclaim the “Malvinas.” Argentine political leaders continued to fuel this enduring desire, using the Falklands issue to unite the people and divert attention from domestic issues.
Argentina’s new equipment plans pose a clear threat to the Falklands. F-16s, especially with tanker support, could undermine British air superiority over the Falklands. Amphibious ships could potentially land and defeat the company-sized British garrison on the islands. However, actually using these assets to capture the Falklands could be an insurmountable challenge for Argentina.
The first problem is diplomatic. As the world recently learned from events in Ukraine, advanced U.S.-made military equipment (including, of course, the F-16) cannot be used without U.S. consent. Without U.S. parts and support, it is difficult for aircraft like the F-16 to stay in the air, let alone maintain combat effectiveness.
The Falklands are about 300 miles from mainland Argentina, separated by the often volatile waters of the South Atlantic. The logistical complexity of launching and sustaining an amphibious operation over such a great distance is enormous. The British Typhoon fighters based at RAF Mount Pleasant alone make such an amphibious operation impossible unless they are somehow dealt with or suppressed. If Britain received warning of an invasion attempt, which would be difficult to prevent, it could probably send an attack submarine or other naval reinforcements to the region.
In 1982, the British submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, which fully demonstrated the threat posed by British submarines and was enough to deprive Argentina of sea control.
So, at least for now, Argentina cannot really retake the Falklands. But the situation also highlights the weakness of the British military today. The Royal Navy currently has only six attack submarines: it will almost certainly not be able to send more than one to the Falklands, and it may not be able to send any submarines. The real concern here is whether Britain’s own capabilities are sufficient, especially the size of its fleet.
Argentina has repeatedly stated that it is determined to regain sovereignty over the Falklands, with President Javier Millai reminding the country that the constitution clearly states that the Falklands must be united with Argentina. The Argentine government continues to apply pressure, despite Britain’s firm statement that sovereignty over the Falklands is not negotiable.
President Milley has made his intentions clear, comparing it to the UK’s return of Hong Kong and asserting that Argentina’s sovereignty over the islands is non-negotiable. He freely admits that achieving sovereignty may take decades, but Argentina’s insistence on its claims highlights the need for the UK to remain tough and send a clear, long-term message that it can fight and win to protect the islanders. We can’t do that if we tell the world we don’t care how many ships and people we have.
Of course, the Royal Navy’s ability to project power at sea is thoroughly outclassed by Argentina. Britain’s destroyers, frigates, submarines and state-of-the-art aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales provide a formidable deterrent – at least when they are at sea with crews and carrier-based aircraft. Frustratingly, the British military has never deployed more than eight jets on one of our new aircraft carriers. The bloody lesson of 1982 – that carrier-based airborne radar aircraft are vital when fleets operate without shore-based air cover – has not been well learned: the Royal Navy’s “Crowsnest” radar helicopters have been plagued with problems.
The number of Royal Navy ships has declined in recent years, a trend that must be reversed to ensure our ability to defend British values is not eroded. More general-purpose ships would play an overall role in keeping the peace and deterring any potential Argentinian aggression.
Even Britain’s amphibious capabilities, especially the assault ships HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark (the predecessors of which played a vital role in the 1982 campaign) have come under considerable scrutiny recently. Despite high-level assurances, there are doubts as to whether these ships will ever return to service. Initially, HMS Bulwark was expected to return to the fleet after maintenance, but will now be ready to deploy only if necessary. The wording has changed from a promise that the ship would return to service to a vague assurance that it might return if needed. That’s not good enough, is it? Ensuring these platforms are fully ready to deploy is vital. Britain without a strong and capable maritime force is simply not Britain.
Britain must clarify the objectives of the Royal Navy and fund it accordingly. Whether the objective is to maintain a nascent capability to retake the Falklands at the expense of other commitments, or to retain a full-fledged ocean-going force with appropriate ancillaries (from attack ships to tankers and supply vessels), priorities must be clear.
Most people will rightly point out that an Argentine attack on the Falklands remains highly unlikely, but my point here is that the situation in which old adversaries are rearming while we are reducing our own capabilities highlights a wider issue: Britain cannot afford to fall behind at sea.
The Royal Navy fleet must grow, and the men and women who operate those ships must be recruited and retained. The government often touts the growth of the fleet as a sign of its commitment to defence. What they don’t tout, however, is that this growth is simply a reversal of some severe cuts made in 2010. Despite rhetoric and even actual improvements to the fleet, the Navy is still struggling with reduced capability in many areas compared to a decade ago.
Our greatest challenge is not the strength of Argentina’s armed forces but the need to strengthen and fund our own. We must not abandon Britain’s proud tradition of being able to fight and win at sea. Compared to a loss like this, I have no fear of Argentina.
Although the article was published in the Daily Telegraph, George Allison is the editor of the British Defence Magazine
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