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As part of the 1993 constitutional reform, Apply for commissionIts widespread application complicates not only the administration of justice but also other settings that require adequate governance. Some of the most deeply infiltrated and troubled institutions are universities and vocational colleges.
Last week marked a historic milestone, as it was the first time since 1993 that the president of the University of San Carlos was not involved in the leadership of one of the two nominating committees for the election of magistrates. This time, the president of the Rafael Landivar University, Mikel Cortes, took over his position, shouldering the responsibility of leading a process in which there were complex struggles and bids by union organizations interested in controlling the magistrates.
(frasepzp1)
In 1985, members of the National Constituent Assembly promulgated a simpler constitution, Article 215, which provides that Supreme Court judges are elected by the Congress of the Republic for a term of six years as follows: four judges are elected directly by Congress; five are nominated by Congress but from a list of thirty candidates proposed by a Nominating Committee composed of the deans of the Faculty of Law or Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of every university in the country; a number of representatives elected by the General Assembly of the Guatemalan Bar and Notaries Association, and a representative of the judiciary appointed by the Supreme Court.
In a period of self-purification of the Congress, after the mountain, a reform complicated the situation and provided that the judges of the Court would be chosen from a list of twenty-six candidates proposed by a nomination committee. This committee would be composed of representatives of the Rector (who would chair the committee), the Dean of the Faculty of Law or Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of each university in the country, and an equal number of representatives elected by the General Assemblies of the Faculties of Lawyers and Notaries, and an equal number of representatives elected by the titular judges of the Court of Appeal and other courts mentioned in another relevant article of the Constitution, 217.
Article 217 is indeed Kafkaesque, proposing an extremely cumbersome nomination process for electing appellate court judges. In short, the 1993 constitutional amendment is a classic example of “Comrade, don’t defend me.”
With power and citizenship being the key words in our column, the relationship between all of this and last week’s discussion of the political and economic implications of the fortieth anniversary of our Constitution came into focus.
Let us remember that when the political constitution was promulgated, the total budget of state revenue and expenditure was close to QR1 billion, and now it is QR120,000; that is, it is an increase that has never been imagined. This makes one think that the interests involved are like a goose that lays golden eggs in large numbers, not only to choose opportunities, but also to take advantage of them, to increase wealth in various disputes, from illegal operations to maintaining monopolies. And privilege disputes.
Such a constitutional change comes at a huge cost. There is a law school factory whose deans promote and seek to participate in the process at all costs. All this leads to a judicial system that fosters corruption in all its aspects. In a study prepared for the General Directorate of Studies of the University of São Carlos – DIGI -, expert Jahir Dabroy points out: “Mention is made of the presence of ten large law firms that have become judicial service companies and that also have influence in these areas of appointment. One of the recommendations is that only one representative be appointed in all universities in the country, which clearly requires an immediate constitutional reform.
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