Where are we heading: a limited understanding of war or open warfare? – Nassif Even

After Israel has twice abandoned the existing rules of engagement (especially the balance of deterrence) and regulated all forms of warfare, we are witnessing a moment of mutual and accelerated escalation, especially on the Lebanese-Israeli front (the assassination of a Lebanese Hezbollah official in Israel’s southern suburbs, as well as the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas Political Bureau in Tehran). The overturning of the rules of engagement was further exacerbated by the assassination of Hamas leader Nasser al-Arouri, also in the southern suburbs, at the beginning of this year. This comes after Israel’s ten-month war of elimination in the Gaza Strip, a conflict whose history introduced a fundamental variable, that of the concept of a unified battlefield as a strategic doctrine against Israel. Unachievable goals were set in the Gaza war and became captive to these goals. This adds an expanded regional dimension to existing and possible future wars, regardless of the geography, scale and intensity of the latter, despite varying degrees of direct involvement. The unity of the five factors and the arena becomes a fundamental variable in the history of this conflict, of course, as we have pointed out, the role, weight and nature of the participation of each arena and its importance in the political, strategic and military operations of the Middle East. The areas that have intensified due to this variable have become hotter, more dangerous and more open to the unknown in different cases. Israel has abandoned the red lines that regulate these understandings and limit hostilities, opening the door to the unknown.
First of all, it must be pointed out that what some people say about the possibility of war is inaccurate. The war has been going on for ten months, with an increase in the intensity of combat and, in the logic of the war, in the military strikes through so-called “surgical strikes”. Firepower has also increased, and the area of ​​targeted warfare has expanded accordingly. Even without a ground invasion of the northern or southern Lebanese fronts, the war continues, as has Israel’s history of wars against Lebanon, the most recent of which was the invasion in the summer of 2006. Israel has learned from past experience that it is not easy to get stuck in the “Lebanese quagmire” and that it cannot achieve the desired effects of a ground war, but this does not mean that it is unlikely to get stuck in the “Lebanese quagmire”. That quagmire is back, and it is currently immersed in the Gaza quagmire.
Israel’s abandonment of the red lines places it in the “Phalanx Alliance” axis, as indicated by the nature of the military reactions expected from this axis, which include the diversification of the nature of the targets and the intensity of military operations, the expansion of the arena of geopolitical confrontations in Israel as a response to its geopolitical expansionary goals in the region, as well as the increasing number of initiatives and mediations by relevant and influential international and regional parties to control these reactions, and the expected Israeli response within certain limits as mutual threats escalate, or in other words, by developing new rules of engagement.
Consider the rules for establishing new red lines based on the rules of symmetry after Israel abandons the existing red lines.
What is new is that the scope of the confrontation has expanded to include all parties and regions in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and all the way to the Mediterranean. It is almost certain that the confrontation in the “conflict theaters” that have been going on for ten months in Gaza and southern Lebanon will be heated up and escalated in the West Bank, although to a lesser extent militarily, with significant consequences. The West Bank is the core of the conflict due to its geographical, strategic and ideological location, and because it is part of “Greater Israel”, for which Israel, eager to complete the process of Judaization in the context of explosive conflict, is open to all possibilities.
Today we face a critical moment: Can the “third party” succeed in crystallizing a new understanding, certainly unwritten, based on adapting to the new escalation that is expected to occur, with increased intensity and geography under a new roof, based on balanced deterrence, and new restrictive rules of sustained and open warfare in time and space, or is the region sliding towards a large-scale war without any restrictions on its geography, unity or objectives? The next few days will reveal the answer to which scenario will become a reality in the region.

Former Lebanese Foreign Minister