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Author: Mohammad Badawi
Since the Sudanese Islamic Movement seized power in a coup in 1989 under the name of the Salvation Revolutionary Committee, the new regime immediately adopted the so-called “moderate Sudanese citizen” policy. This is a thinly veiled attempt to instill Islamic political ideology into Sudan’s governance and consolidate their control. To achieve this goal, they systematically restrict freedoms in both the public and private spheres through the implementation and enforcement of oppressive laws and regulations, especially the Public Order Law.
This agenda was furthered by a group of fanatics who openly promoted Islamic slogans aimed at fostering a new Islamic culture. This agenda extended to the arts, with state television even incorporating religious symbols into its logo.
Ultimately, the regime’s Islamization efforts seek to use religion as a shield against criticism while legitimizing attacks on any dissent against its rule.
Furthermore, the regime strategically repackaged the civil war against the SPLM as a “jihad” to mobilize civilians to fight on the front lines. This involved a systematic plan implemented by many organizations charged with this goal, such as the “Call for Jihad” (Neda Aljehad) and the weekly Friday night television show “Sahat Alfeda.” Furthermore, regime-linked imams used Friday prayers to promote this narrative.
To this day, the regime continues to use mosques as gathering points for its own purposes. This includes calling on people to pray at night to show their support, and enforcing pledges of allegiance at least twice a week, known as “Giam Alil.”
During the previous regime, mosques on some university campuses in Sudan were secretly used by student members of the Islamic movement to store weapons such as iron rods and other materials. These hidden items were used during violent clashes with opposition students, especially during university association elections.
In the most recent chapter, during the 2018 Sudanese revolution, mosques once again became a political tool. Many regime-linked imams used their platforms and Friday sermons to undermine peaceful protests and their participants, falsely accusing them of working against the interests of the Sudanese people. They also distorted Islamic teachings to discourage dissent against Muslim rulers, misrepresenting it as a religious taboo.
Since the outbreak of war in Sudan on April 15, 2023, mosques have become legitimate targets for the warring factions. Many Muslim imams who advocate peace have been arrested and at least 12 mosques in Khartoum State, as well as others in El Geneina and El Fasher, have been shelled. Notably, on June 23, 2024, the RSF targeted the Altijania Sufi Mosque in El Fasher, which residents had been using as a shelter. The attack unfortunately resulted in the death of eight children and the injury of at least 12 people, including children. It is noteworthy that RSF commander General Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, as well as other key figures such as Moussa Hilal and the late Major General Ali Yaqub, belong to the Tijania Sufi Order.
Historically, Sudan’s mosques have been respected and shielded from political conflict and war. However, since 1989, the Islamist movement regime has turned them into platforms for political messaging and mobilization. Recent events have shown that political Islamists do not hesitate to exploit or target these sacred places in their quest for power. Their history bears witness to this, as seen in the 2004 Darfur conflict, when at least 19 women and their babies were burned alive in the village of Arsura simply because of their ethnic affiliation with the rebel group.
In short, political Islam has consistently abused places of worship for its own ends, disregarding their sanctity and targeting them in conflicts. This hardline approach erodes the values of those who join the armed forces, putting them in a position where they must follow the misguided leadership of political Islamists, even if it means violating the fundamental right to religious freedom.
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