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Military and law enforcement operations The storm of celebrations in Croatia over the end of the Homeland War would not have been possible without the active participation of various units of the Croatian Defense Council. The joint actions of the HV and HVO in the final operations of the Homeland War, from November 1994 to October 1995, marked a period of large-scale operations in the Republic of Croatia from Jasenovac to Knin region and in Bosnia from the Dinaric Mountains to the Vrbas River in the east and to the Sana River in the north, covering a total area of more than 10,000 square kilometers, leading to the end of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, facilitating the signing of the final peace agreement.
Of the Croatian army’s nearly 24,000 soldiers, about 11,500 HVO members entered Knin.
Let us remind you that the Croatian army that entered Knin numbered about 23,900 soldiers, of whom up to 11,500 were members of the HVO, 12,400 were soldiers of the HV.
With the end of the fighting of Operation Summer 95 (July 25-29), all the goals set in the plan were achieved. The units of the Second Krajina Army of the Republika Srpska Army were defeated, the Knin-Drvar road was cut, which semi-encircled the units of the Krajina Serb Army in northern Dalmatia, and 1,600 square kilometers of the region were placed under the control of the HV and HVO. The positive results of the summer of 95 gave the Croatian Army a huge strategic advantage over the SVK, which had come to the fore in Operation Storm.
As the largest liberation operation of the Croatian Army, Operation Oluja received more public attention than any other operation during the period 1994-1995. However, Operation Oluja should be understood as a continuation of the liberation operations of the Croatian Army carried out since the end of 1994. 1994. Together with it formed an operational unit. The tasks performed by the HV and HVO collective areas of Split during the storm were extremely important.
Bosansko Grahovo – Knin, the communication section between Knin and Graczac – completed by the collective area of HV and HVO
The main goal of the ZP Split operation was to make the city of Knin the political and military center of the RSK. To this end, it was planned to use the main forces (the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades) to launch a fierce attack in the direction of Bosansko Grahovo-Knin, break through the enemy’s first line of defense, cut off the Knin-Graczac traffic, and then liberate Knin.
On the eve of the storm, the total number of troops available to ZP Split was 32,000 people, distributed among two Guards Brigades (4th and 7th), two Guards Battalions (2nd Battalion of the 9th GBR and 81st Guards Battalion), two reserve brigades (112th and 144th), one infantry brigade (113th), one PZO brigade (204th), six home defense regiments (7th, 15th, 134th, 142nd, 6th and 126th), two artillery divisions (14th and 20th), one anti-tank division (11th) and all HVO units deployed from Grahov to Kupreška Vrata. The balance of forces on the Croatian side was the most favorable compared to previous operations. Thus, the ratio of manpower was 2.1:1, the ratio of armor was 1.1:1, and the ratio of artillery was 1.3:1.
On the other hand, the enemy of the joint regional division is the SVK North Dalmatian Corps stationed in Knin. The corps (only nominally) has two motorized brigades, two light brigades, two infantry brigades and artillery and rocket units.
The ZP Split operation began in the early hours of August 4. The initial attack broke through the lines of the Knin Corps from all planned directions, and most of its forces quickly retreated without a fight. The dynamics with which the Croatian army conducted the operation made it impossible for the enemy to establish effective resistance in depth after the first line of defense was breached, so the resistance of the Serbian army turned into a series of unrelated and poorly coordinated defensive actions.
On August 4, the front made tactical progress, creating conditions for the next day’s attack on Knin. On the second day of the operation, the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades received this task as a separate operation. The liberation of Knin began at 5:00 am and ended at 11:00 am, achieving the main goal of the operation. After that, the enemy’s resistance became weaker and weaker, so during the day, the various units turned to pursue the defeated units of SVK. From August 5, ZP Split performed most of the tasks. In the following two days, the intensity of combat operations decreased, and the Serb rebels retreated to Bosnia and Herzegovina via Otrich. On August 8, the Croatian army broke out at the national border, which made ZP Split fully complete the tasks of Operation Storm.
During the four-day offensive operation, the ZP Split forces liberated Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš and Flicka, and the SVK’s Knin Corps was decisively defeated, liberating an area of about 4,000 square kilometers. The key to the success of the operation was the possession of salient objectives around Knin and the use of full maneuver during the actual assault on the city, which allowed Croatian troops to cross the Dinara River into Knin from the north behind the rebellious Serbs.
HVO surveillance of Kupres and Sipovo
While the operation was being conducted, two guards brigades of the HVO were participating in the defense of Livanisko Polje and Gramochy, and the units of the Tomislavgrad collective region tried to use the success of the operation to occupy more advantageous positions in the Kupres area on the battlefield.
The goal was to control the main heights, bring the Kupres-Shipovo area under fire control and create conditions for further advances to Shipovo and Jajce. On August 4, the 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades of the HVO began their offensive, and over the next few days they made small advances, thus tying down the units of the 2nd Krajina Corps of the VRS, thus preventing the possibility of its assistance. SVK.
HVO participates in the cash storm: the importance of Croatian troops from Herceg-Bosnia is crucial for a positive outcome of the liberation operation
The assessment of the role of the Army of the Republic of Croatia in Herceg-Bosna by General Ante Gotovina, the commander of ZP Split, himself is probably the most appropriate description of the situation on the ground in those years.
“To the east of Bosnia Grahov, along the battle line, other parts of the subordinate units of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Guards Corps were on duty, which did not in any way call into question the stability of the front achieved in the previous operation in the summer of 95. If we add the importance of the continuity of the Croatian troops in the operations that made Storm possible since the end of 1994, then the importance of the Croatian troops from Herceg-Bosna can be described as essential for the conduct of the liberation operation and its positive results.”
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