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“A “non-inclusive” ceasefire undermines inclusive political dialogue. Avoid this
By Trayo A. Ali
■ The latest development in the Sudanese conflict is the US proposal to hold ceasefire talks in Geneva (Switzerland) on August 14, 2024. The US has so far invited two major forces – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and excluded other local active armed forces.
■ First of all, it must be clearly stated that any quick action that can achieve a ceasefire, calm the situation, restore normalcy and alleviate the current unprecedented and serious humanitarian crisis is good and welcome. However, since this announcement has caused a strong reaction from the Sudanese public and different political factions, we should note that it is not the determination of a new date for the resumption of negotiations or the change of the venue that has caused this debate. What has caused this debate is the “repetition” of the same old “non-inclusive” approach in the ceasefire.
The approach of a “non-inclusive” ceasefire arrangement (as it was established as a failed strategy in Sudan’s long peace process) is unwise, irrational, impractical, and undesirable.
This is because, firstly, the recent history of the Sudanese peace process has proven it to be faulty. Secondly, logically, it constitutes a stumbling block that contradicts, corrodes, hinders and frustrates the goals of a successful ceasefire and/or a successful political dialogue.
In addition to the above, there are other major issues that can only be addressed through an inclusive strategy, including the fact that any successful humanitarian solution (by its very nature) requires the inclusive participation of all armed actors on the ground, and the prevailing state of “mistrust” between actors, whose fears can only be minimized and/or alleviated by their participation. This becomes even more necessary in the face of the involvement of “non-neutral” third parties in ceasefire mediation, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
■ what to do?
To avoid any setbacks or repetition of past mistakes, it is reasonable, possible, and practical to follow the following principles and realities:
■ First
We need to be consistent (the ceasefire should be designed to fit in with the “all-inclusive” political dialogue already proposed). We should avoid any asymmetric arrangements that would contradict the overall goal.
What these previous agreements can offer is the irrefutable, indisputable, and consistent fact that the more incomplete and/or less inclusive an agreement is, the more likely it is to fail; and the more times any agreement fails, the more prolonged the conflict and the more armed groups will emerge.
It goes without saying that designing an inclusive ceasefire arrangement is the only rational and prerequisite for the two “complementary” tracks (ceasefire and political dialogue) to merge in a symmetrical, compatible, non-confrontational and non-adversarial manner and arrive at the much-needed holistic, viable, sustainable, coherent and comprehensive solution.
■ second.
We should bear in mind the principle that “many wrongs do not make up for a right.” The record of the Sudanese war is but one of four major bilateral ceasefire arrangements, all of which failed.
In fact, the United States has been an important player in the Sudanese peace process and will continue to be an indispensable player, including mobilizing resources, sending senior envoys, US media coverage of the Sudanese conflict, helping the UN Security Council pass resolutions, and funding peacekeeping operations (especially UNAMID and the UN Mission in Sudan).
The United States’ involvement in the Sudan peace process began with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, commonly known as the “Navasha Agreement”), the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (2006), the Doha Delta Reconciliation Agreement (DDPD) (2011), and the Juba Peace Agreement (2020), in which the United States played a central role.
But all these agreements (including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement) are not inclusive. To a large extent, they are comprehensive in terms of the issues but not in terms of the parties involved. Obviously, this “partiality” is the fundamental and main problem factor that has led to the failure of these agreements.
Non-inclusive arrangements are likely to fail and ultimately return the situation to square one, sparking conflict all over again.
That is why we need to correct our approach to make it inclusive and achieve better results.
Isn’t it time for us to avoid falling into the same predicament?
■ third
Humanitarian reasons
Since the highest strategic objective behind the ceasefire is humanitarian (unhindered relief assistance to the affected population and protection of civilians), any ceasefire agreement must (by definition) include the establishment of implementation mechanisms (monitoring, verification and reporting), so the above tasks imply a joint mechanism representing the signatories of the agreement.
■ Four
We all acknowledge that a major and deep-rooted problem that has divided and entangled Sudan’s political forces is widespread mistrust.
The virus is powerful enough to corrode Sudan’s entire political system and prevent any meaningful political reconciliation among the various political forces.
Therefore, any ceasefire arrangement that excludes key stakeholders will only exacerbate the situation and increase tensions, especially among armed groups. In view of this, the United States must advocate for ceasefire arrangements that are inclusive of all relevant parties.
This is why the question of inclusion is of paramount importance in the thinking of armed movements whose grassroots supporters have lived through the hell of the genocide and consider their participation in an inclusive ceasefire to be the only condition guaranteeing the viability of any particular ceasefire.
Moreover, what adds fuel to the fire and makes them even more uncomfortable is the involvement of countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that are considered non-neutral. To attract the attention of the United States (it is enough) just mention the evidence provided by former senior US official John Prendergast and Ambassador Anthony Lake in an article published on July 31, 2024, entitled “UAE’s Secret War in Sudan. How International Pressure Can Stop Genocidal Violence”.
Clearly, we have an obligation to approach this challenge with caution, because the greater the extent to which any one party is excluded, the greater the gulf of mistrust.
■ V. Conclusion
The long journey that the Sudanese have gone through can only show one thing: inclusiveness is a magic word. Non-inclusive arrangements are the root cause of the consecutive failures of the four agreements.
Excluding any armed party (or parties) from the conflict would only create a structural flaw in the ceasefire arrangement.
Now is the time to set boundaries to avoid a repetition of harmful tactics.”
This problem will not go away by ignoring it; we all have to face the reality! “As the simple saying goes, an experienced man never gets stabbed in the same hole twice!”
As the current US Special Envoy, Mr. Tom Perello himself has stated on several occasions that US policy will be developed by listening to the views of the Sudanese people at large, I prefer to believe that the United States, with its sharp mind and experience in Sudanese affairs, should be savvy enough to re-examine the facts presented in this argument and help the Sudanese avoid a fragmented approach to a non-inclusive ceasefire that will lead us to the same dead end.
We certainly need to follow the Biblical dictum: Let us return to the foundation stone that the builders rejected. In this case, that is “inclusion”.
You can contact Mr. Trayo A. Ali at the following email addresses: (email protected)
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