How to view the new alliance between Russia and North Korea

Despite the strategic discomfort caused by Putin, the West must be careful not to over- or underestimate the importance of the treaty. Putin’s recent visit to Pyongyang was his first 24 years——Very pragmatic.

Russia desperately needs North Korean ammunition, weapons, and workers to continue its war against Ukraine, and North Korea, more isolated than ever, needs diplomatic support, as well as energy, food, cash, and sensitive military technology that only the Kremlin can.

Russian military technologies are particularly important to Kim Jong-un because they could allow North Korea’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles to survive re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere and hit any target in the world without being intercepted by missile defense systems. Similarly, if North Korea were able to produce silent nuclear submarines with Russian help, this would pose a huge security risk not only to South Korea and Japan, but also to the United States.

The risk of military imbalance

If Russia does provide North Korea with such sensitive technology, it will lead to the collapse of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and even in Northeast Asia as a whole. But there is a big limitation that may prevent Russia from doing so: China’s global strategy is inconsistent with that of Russia and North Korea.

China’s primary strategic task is to win the global competition with the U.S. Chinese leaders hope to replace the U.S.-led unipolar international system with a China-led multipolar international system, and are trying to alienate the U.S. and its allies, hoping to pull some allies into their orbit.

Despite the “unlimited” relationship between China and Russia, China does not provide direct military assistance to Russia precisely because it wants to prevent European countries from falling fully into the arms of the United States.

Likewise, China has been working to build friendlier diplomatic ties with South Korea, including attending a trilateral summit between South Korea, Japan and China in Seoul in May. Shown His commitment to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Then, just one day before Russia and North Korea signed a new treaty, China and South Korea held a 2+2 high-level diplomatic and security dialogue in Seoul.

China has long advocated for stability on the Korean Peninsula, largely because it wants North Korea to serve as a buffer zone between China and South Korean and U.S. troops stationed south of the Demilitarized Zone.

Marriage of convenience

Instead, Russia’s most pressing concern is winning the war it started. In desperation, Putin seems willing to postpone any other issues. But since her new deal with Kim Jong-un is little more than a marriage of convenience, it may start to falter once the war in Ukraine ends. Since Donald Trump has announced that he will end the war on his first day in office (supposedly giving Putin whatever he wants), that moment may not be far away.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un will be desperate to acquire the highly sensitive Russian military technology he craves. His primary goal is to establish North Korea as a nuclear state. Actually The international community must accept this.

Of course, if Russia does yield to North Korean pressure and provide Kim Jong-un with the technology he wants, the alliance between the United States, Japan and South Korea will become stronger. Joint military exercises will become more frequent, and the United States will deploy more strategic assets to the peninsula. South Korean public opinion may also be further inclined to support a domestic nuclear weapons program or to send U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korean territory. These developments will run counter to China’s strategic interests.

Although China is notably excluded from the strategic marriage between Russia and North Korea, it has significant leverage over both smaller countries. China’s economy is roughly nine times the size of Russia’s and more than a thousand times the size of North Korea’s. Russia might not be able to continue fighting in Ukraine if China stopped buying Russian energy exports or stopped supplying dual-use materials (materials that have both civilian and military uses and are therefore not subject to sanctions). Similarly, the North Korean economy simply cannot survive without Chinese food, energy, and trade.

In the face of this dynamic, the West should focus on exploiting the strategic inconsistencies between China, Russia, and North Korea. For the United States, this means maintaining diplomatic engagement with China and deterrence against Russia. If it is confirmed that Russia has indeed provided sensitive military technology to North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan should take dramatic steps to strengthen security cooperation and establish more direct links between East Asia and NATO.

Chinese and American strategic interests overlap more on the Korean Peninsula than they do on Ukraine or the Middle East. Both countries want stability in the region, suggesting that diplomacy to achieve that goal has a real chance of success if both countries make an effort.

Yoon Young-kwan, former foreign minister of the Republic of Korea, is currently the president of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

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