Precursors and deterrents to the Lebanon War – Abdullah Sanawi

According to the Americans, signs of war are spreading in Lebanon, as if they were a prelude to a large-scale regional war with “devastating” consequences.
According to the Israeli army, its forces have completed preparations, the operational plan has been approved and they are awaiting orders to launch a large-scale attack on southern Lebanon.
In the midst of equally alarming scenarios, there is a real deterrent factor that makes reaching the point of explosion an act of colossal folly, striking a blow to the very heart of the security and future of the entire region for many years to come.
Between foreshadowing and deterrence, everything is possible.
Given the deterrence factor, there will be no war, except for the situation in Israel and its contradictory calculations.
However, if this view were extended to Israel itself, rationality might give way to something akin to political madness.
With Israel’s politics divided and fragile, its military exhausted and in crisis, the military and security elite have warned that if the war does not stop, it faces a “strategic collapse” as what they call “gaza achievements” erode.
Nevertheless, the government, which has been called the most right-wing since the founding of the Hebrew state, is inclined to expand the scope of the war so as not to say that it has accepted defeat.
“They are a bunch of crazy people who are no good for anything,” said opposition leader Yair Lapid, describing two extremist ministers, Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, and those who were with them.
The main pretext for the Lebanon war was: the restoration of security in northern Israel and the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons to the settlements, but they failed to ask themselves the necessary question: Is war a solution…does it exacerbate the problem?
It turns out that the Lebanese resistance is a support front for the Gaza resistance, and if the Gaza war stops, the conflict on the northern border will also stop at the same time.
The dilemma here is that Biden’s plan for a ceasefire and prisoner hostage exchange has all but disappeared as a slim hope.
For Netanyahu, the option of going to war with Lebanon helps him stay in power and push the shaky U.S. administration to his side, no matter the consequences.
As for Hezbollah, it is not asking for war, but it is ready for a long and painful confrontation with Israel.
Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has warned that he will respond to any Israeli aggression without rules or caps.
This is a message of deterrence, the effect of which extends to any regional parties that might in some way support military action against Lebanon.
His claims are credible because of the size and type of missile he has.
According to repeated international reports, this number is ten times greater than the total number of the Palestinian resistance movement.
Operation Hoopoe’s imagery was extremely precise, targeting many military bases and sensitive areas inside Israel, a preemptive deterrent message ahead of any possible attack.
No one in the region or the world is calling for a large-scale war, except for Netanyahu and his government’s political and personal interests.
The United States is worried that expanding the war will lead to widespread chaos in the region, undermine its strategic interests, and seriously damage Israel’s functional role in the West’s Middle East strategy.
It is even more afraid that its surplus and deficit will be dragged into an unwanted position in the face of a Republican bid before the upcoming presidential election.
The Pentagon has made no secret of its concern about the situation on the Israel-Lebanon front, calling for a “resolution of tensions”. The first will end.
All regional players came to the same conclusion, without exception!
Amid the chaotic chaos of the United States, its deterrent capacity has declined.
This is a fact confirmed by the US State Department, which declares Israel’s security a “sacred issue” as if it is a reassuring message to stand by it even if it pushes the entire region into an unknown abyss!
America’s deterrent power has lost its cachet.
This is the reality despite the fact that US presidential adviser Amos Hochstein travelled to the region to de-escalate the situation, but no effective action was taken.
Worst of all, he found himself party to a US-Israel correspondence regarding the fact of the withholding of arms shipments, calling Netanyahu’s statement false!
Both the timing and nature of these interactions speak to the yawning trust gap between “Netanyahu” and “Biden.”
First, he blamed his inability to resolve the war and achieve “absolute victory” on the refusal to supply him with weapons, comparing himself to Winston Churchill who said to Americans during World War II: “Give us the equipment and we will do the job!”
Second, he accused him, through his advisers and spokespeople, of being ungrateful for standing with Israel, something no other American president has done.
The negotiation process shifted in a clear and direct way from blocking arms deals to working with Republicans to interfere in the US presidential election.
Biden’s dilemma seems obvious, and his position is shaky.
He wants to ride two horses at once, supporting the Jewish lobby in his campaign and improving his image among younger sections of American society and among the Arab and Islamic communities that oppose the Gaza war and accuse him of participating in it.
His concern is whether he will meet with Netanyahu during his expected visit to Washington and speech to Congress, when no decision has been made!
Meanwhile, other letters between Ben Gvir and Netanyahu have dominated Israel’s public space, suggesting the depth of the government crisis that could exacerbate a war adventure in Lebanon.
The first required that he be a direct participant in the administration of the war, with no political or military experience.
Secondly, he was reluctant, fearing that the war council would become a circus in which secrets would be made public before it was dissolved.
Netanyahu’s decision to form a small ministerial security team, including Ben Gvir, was an overworked attempt to defuse the crisis, but it seemed to reveal the limits of the capacity of the entire political hierarchy to decide on extremely serious issues such as the war in Lebanon.
Israel’s fragile political situation should have prevented any risky moves to expand the scope of the war, but paradoxically, it might have prompted action!