Iran has no choice but to negotiate

Arian Tabatabai*

Regardless of who wins the US presidential election, Joe Biden or Donald Trump, the next US administration will have to confront a dangerous situation with Iran.

While Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign has devastated Iran’s economy, it has failed to force Tehran to capitulate or cause its collapse. On the contrary, as international inspectors have confirmed, Tehran is closer to possessing nuclear weapons today than when Trump took office, and its regional aggression remains unabated. Most recently, the Iranian regime was accused of planning to assassinate the U.S. ambassador to South Africa in retaliation for the killing of its leader, Qassem Soleimani, last January.

To counter these threats, the next US president must make a serious diplomatic effort. Indeed, both Biden and Trump have expressed their willingness to continue negotiations with Tehran. In a recent opinion piece, Biden reiterated his commitment to reverse the current administration’s policies and renegotiate the 2015 nuclear deal that Trump canceled in 2018. The former US vice president’s proposal can be summarized as follows: “If Iran returns to compliance with the terms of the agreement, the United States will rejoin the deal, which will serve as a starting point for continued negotiations.” For his part, Trump has repeatedly stated that if re-elected, he would be able to reach an agreement with Iran within weeks of his inauguration. However, the most important major question facing the next administration is: how and when will it take the first steps to re-engage with Tehran?

Observers in the United States and Europe believe that there is a good opportunity to reach an agreement with Iran between the inauguration of the new US president in January next year and the Iranian presidential election in June. President Hassan Rouhani is not eligible to run again, so more conservative politicians may replace him. Therefore, a re-elected Biden or Trump must act quickly to reach an agreement with Iran while Rouhani is still in power.

The new U.S. administration certainly has compelling reasons to restore diplomatic relations with Iran sooner rather than later in order to reduce nuclear and regional risks, but it should not rush into a deal in the hope of influencing Iran’s domestic policy, or fear that it will close the window of opportunity. The new administration should also not impose a rule that there is no chance of establishing diplomatic relations without Rouhani’s presence.

The election of Rouhani in 2013 was key to the diplomatic success. During the Ahmadinejad era, U.S. diplomacy faced opponents who were less willing or unwilling to negotiate, and Rouhani’s election broke the deadlock. However, U.S. policymakers should not overestimate Rouhani’s personal role or assume that he can play a similar role again.

In 2013, Rouhani had significant political capital and was a strong contender to succeed Khamenei. Today, his position has collapsed, and with it the nuclear deal he defended and the economy he promised to revive. Rouhani may be keen to open talks with Washington in the remaining months of his presidency to rebuild his legacy and show that the nuclear deal was not in vain. By the same token, major powers have a vested interest in seeing Rouhani fail in the remainder of his presidency. Therefore, Washington should not assume that Rouhani is capable of reaching a deal, even if it is in his political interest.

Ultimately, Iran may have no choice but to negotiate with the US president, and the timing and scope of the talks may be determined after the election results are announced and Tehran forms a general understanding of the new government, its goals and policies. Iran will also try to avoid falling into a state of diplomatic despair.

The new U.S. administration has good reasons to move quickly to hold talks with Tehran to try to calm tensions, but the timetable guiding the U.S.-Iran diplomatic process must serve U.S. goals, not the other way around.

*Political analyst at the RAND Corporation, and author of “No Invasion, No Loss: Iran’s National Security Strategy.” – (Foreign Policy)