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Russia’s influence in Portuguese-speaking Africa has grown in recent years, as the former Soviet Union continued to support countries struggling against Portuguese colonialism.
In fact, all other CPLP African countries, except Cape Verde, have not suspended relations with Russia, as Portugal and Cape Verde did, but have strengthened them: this is the case with Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Luanda seems to be taking its own path, getting closer to the United States, but without decisively cutting ties with Russia. As for the Brazilian Lulista, it seems to be closer to Russia than during the Bolsonaro government, and the anti-Western rhetoric in Brazil is stronger today than ever before.
There are several explanations for the Putin regime’s “conquest” of Portuguese-speaking Africa:
1. Russia is willing to send Wagner mercenaries (now renamed the “Africa Corps”) to fight insurgents or local opposition without serious concerns about local democracy or human rights in exchange for guarantees of free access or low prices for natural resources.
2. Supplies of grain (partly stolen from Ukraine) and other foodstuffs.
3. Provide or transfer oil or gas at low cost.
4. Dispatch “technical consultants” and short-term financing loans.
5. Pure corruption by local leaders.
For these reasons, Russia’s presence in Africa is growing. Currently, the Afrika Korps is stationed in the Central African Republic, in a potential conflict with the Portuguese army, which consists of 243 soldiers, 188 of whom are members of MINUSCA and 55 of whom are participating in the EUTM RCA training mission. In addition to the Central African Republic, Russia has been using the Afrika Korps to have “ununiformed” soldiers in Libya, Mali (where 80 Russians were recently killed in a Tuareg ambush), Sudan, and Burkina Faso. The original plan was to deploy more than 40,000 mercenaries in Africa, but this goal was not achieved due to recruitment problems caused by Russia’s losses in Ukraine (casualties have been above a thousand per day).
The presence of Russian mercenaries has not gone smoothly everywhere: in Mozambique, for example, in 2019 (taking into account Mozambique gas) “Wagner” sent hundreds of mercenaries to the north of the country to fight against the forces of the Islamic State. But this Russian contingent was ineffective: language and cultural barriers made integration with government troops difficult, and the Wagners were surprised by a large number of casualties (seven mercenaries were captured and beheaded by the rebels). After a few months, they withdrew from Mozambique. Today, it is the army of neighboring Uganda that stabilizes the situation and ensures peace on the territory.
If military ties between CPLP countries appear to be stronger than ever, the same seems to be happening on the diplomatic front, albeit to a lesser degree, when it comes to UN General Assembly votes.
But it should not be like this. The CPLP should have a common position that is more in line with the interests of all its countries. This is provided for in Article 4 of its Statutes: “a) political and diplomatic consultations among its members on matters of international relations, in particular strengthening their presence in international forums; b) cooperation in all fields, including education, health, science and technology, defence, maritime and ocean affairs, agriculture, food security, public administration, communications, justice, public security, economy, commerce, culture, sports and social communications.”
Now, the recent military agreement between Sao Tome and Principe and the Russian Federation, although opaque and secret, as far as we know, conflicts with several paragraphs of these regulations, thus calling into question the seriousness of the countries that signed the agreement. In this community, they see their participation as free and sovereign states, without obligations to belong to the community. If it conflicts in such a blatant way, we have to ask what is the point of a community of independent states that does not respect these fundamental principles. What is the use of the CPLP, which is geographically maximal (“all” Portuguese-speaking countries plus the dubious Equatorial Guinea), but whose position in the face of the biggest global conflict of our time is minimized to the point of zero?
What is the use of the CPLP if it cannot even guarantee that one of its member states has not “fully” abolished the death penalty, as it had pledged during the accession process, and “to its satisfaction” (in the words of the current Executive Secretary Zacarías da Costa)? What does the CPLP think of the human rights situation in this “Portuguese-speaking” country?
Rui Martins, founder Party democratization movement
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