Was it an own goal for the role it played in Wagner’s Mali defeat?

Ukraine’s foreign minister has just concluded his latest trip to Africa, with the country at risk of paying a severe diplomatic price for helping separatist rebels in northern Mali inflict heavy damage on Russian military operator Wagner late last month.

An ambush on 27 July in Tinzaouteng reportedly left 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers dead.

This was a tragic military blow. The mercenary group was once led by the late President Yevgeny Prigozhin but is now controlled by Russia’s official defense command.

Just two days later, Andrei Yusov, spokesman for Kiev’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), said that Tuareg rebels in Mali “had obtained the necessary information, and not just information, which allowed the success of the military operation against Russian war criminals”.

Subsequent reports said Ukrainian special forces had trained separatists to use attack drones.

Yet for many Africans, it is just another example of outside powers using the continent as a bloody arena for their own rivalries.

As expected, Mali’s ruling military junta and its allied regime in neighboring Niger protested by severing diplomatic ties with Kiev.

But more significant was a statement from the regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), which was unequivocal in its condemnation despite its own diplomatic problems with the military regimes in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

It expressed its “strong opposition and unequivocal condemnation of any external interference that could pose a threat to peace and security in West Africa and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontation”.

Rumors that some jihadists had teamed up with Tuareg separatists to launch the Tinzawarten attack have further fueled public anger.

The Senegalese Foreign Ministry summoned the Ukrainian ambassador to Dakar in protest after the ambassador posted a video on Facebook about Yussuf’s gloating remarks.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius last week. But he may now have to do some major repairs in West Africa after harsh words from ECOWAS and Senegal.

Many sub-Saharan African governments—even those that privately distrust Moscow—may view Kyiv’s external military adventurism as unhelpful and likely to undo the goodwill painstakingly cultivated over the past two years through Ukraine’s peace diplomacy.

Of course, from a narrow military perspective, helping Wagner inflict the worst defeat in African history was a success for the Ukrainians.

The mercenary contractor – now officially renamed the Afrika Korps after coming under Russian government control – has doubled its staff in Mali to around 2,000 in the past two years.

The news of Tinzawatten’s heavy losses was therefore shocking, especially considering that the Malian army and Wagner’s forces had captured Kidal, the “capital” of the Tuareg rebels, last November.

The Tinzavatten incident marked a return to the separatists’ offensive—and it soon became clear that they had the support of new partners.

Kiev’s hint of direct intervention confirmed its readiness to strike back against Russian President Vladimir Putin beyond its own borders.

In fact, this was not the first time that there had been direct intervention in Wagner’s military operations in Africa.

There are strong indications that Ukrainian special forces carried out drone attacks in Sudan in August and September last year in support of the military regime led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Over the past year, It has been in the midst of a brutal power struggle Along with its former allies, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, nicknamed “Hemedti”, and assisted by Wagner.

Some Ukrainian military commentators, such as Evgeniy Dikiy, former commander of Ukraine’s Aidar Battalion, have described the country’s alleged military intervention in Africa as a battle for survival following the February 2022 invasion by Russian troops.

Mr Dickey argued that Kiev had no Africa policy but had a grudge against Russia, and Wagner in particular.

But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government may not see the issue so simplistically.

Because it knows that the fight back against Moscow is not just about the battlefield; diplomacy and trade are equally important.

Kyiv became painfully aware of this fact after the 2022 invasion, especially with regard to Africa.

On March 2 of that year, at the United Nations General Assembly, only 28 of the 54 African member states voted to condemn the invasion.

While only a handful of Moscow’s close allies actually voted in support of Russia’s actions, many other African governments, including some generally considered staunchly pro-Western, actively abstained or were absent from the vote.

Later, when President Putin withdrew from an agreement that allowed Ukrainian and Russian grain exports, many bound for Africa, to pass safely through the Black Sea, many sub-Saharan African governments chose to view the setback with neutrality rather than blaming Moscow.

While the importance of this particular issue has receded, as Ukraine has largely restored freedom of food shipments following the attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Foreign Ministry team in Kyiv remains convinced of the need to rebuild political and economic networks across Africa.

Mr. Kuleba has visited Africa four times. While his campaign to win goodwill and build partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa has not been without its challenges — he was disappointed to receive an audience with President Cyril Ramaphosa during a visit to South Africa late last year — he has also had significant successes.

For example, Zambia attended the Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland in June and, unlike some other participants, signed the final communiqué (whose terms satisfied Kyiv).

Last week, Mr Kuleba visited the Zambian capital, Lusaka, where he was received by President Hakainde Hichilema.

By engaging with African countries, Ukraine is now seeking to make up for the diplomatic ground it lost during its first three decades of independence when it focused primarily on domestic affairs.

While Russia inherited the global diplomatic influence of the former Soviet Union, newly independent countries such as Ukraine had to build their own diplomatic networks from scratch.

Due to limited resources, Kyiv has only opened eight embassies across the African continent in more than 30 years, located in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.

However, having unconsciously awakened in 2022 to the need to win friends and influence others, Kyiv is rapidly expanding its reach, aiming to build a network of 20 African embassies, the first 10 of which have already been announced.

In April, Maksym Soubkh, Kyiv’s special envoy for the Middle East and Africa, arrived in Abidjan to open an embassy in Côte d’Ivoire.

Kyiv is offering more than just diplomatic cooperation.

Eight sub-Saharan countries have benefited from the “Food from Ukraine” food aid programme.

It also plans to increase development aid, strengthen two-way trade and provide more university places for African students.

A controversial military adventure against Russian mercenaries looks like an ill-advised risk that could jeopardize all the diplomatic goodwill and economic rewards Ukraine hopes to gain from its broadly aggressive sub-Saharan strategy.

Paul Melly is a consulting fellow at Chatham House, Africa Programme, London.