Military experts assess Ukraine’s Kursk operation: One thing is drowning in the fog

Fighting was recorded in the Lyubinovka and Sudza regions. The invaders’ channels announced that the Ukrainian troops had penetrated about 15 kilometers and captured 11 settlements (mostly villages). The last news was that the town of Sudza was surrounded and fighting was still going on there.

So far, it is unclear what size and what units are involved on the Ukrainian side. Ukrainian experts call it an intelligence diversion group or intelligence battalion, which is composed of 10 to 500 soldiers. Russia claims that the attack in the area was not carried out by Russian volunteers fighting for Ukraine, but by troops of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (there is a battalion-sized unit on the contact line and the rest are in reserve).

It is said that the brigade not only has artillery support during combat, but also has air defense forces equipped with the Booker air defense system.

So, the first success looks good, but the purpose of the operation is still shrouded in mystery.

The invaders were clearly unprepared for such an action by the Ukrainian army again. This attack showed that the Russian border is as thin as a wall.

Moreover, the intelligence and reaction of the attackers to the situation remained below the threshold. As experts already mentioned yesterday, the occupiers’ Telegram channels announced a few days ago that Ukrainian mechanized forces were gathering in the Sumy region. Despite this, the Ukrainian defenders cut through the border like a hot knife through butter.

This sent a clear signal to the domestic Russian audience: “While saving Ukraine from the Faucherists, Russia Unable to defend oneself.

The Bryansk-Suja-Belgorod railway passed through Suja and supplied the invasion groups operating in the direction of Kharkov. However, there were two other railway lines, Kursk-Belgorod and Staroyoskol-Valuiki, whose supplies had been exhausted over the years.

In addition, they have a mutual connection (Staryj Oskol – Kirovsky), which can direct the flow in the desired direction. These two railway lines crisscross each other with a very developed extensive road network. Therefore, even if the Bryansk-Souza-Belgorod railway line is lost, the Russians can continue to supply the troops in the direction of Kharkov.

In order to have at least a partial impact on the aggressor’s logistics, the Ukrainians should not only penetrate 15 kilometers deep and cross the above-mentioned railways (most likely individual Ukrainian units have already done this), but also maintain this territory, build defenses, ensure interaction between units and be able to operate artillery and air defense from the depth of the defense.

And where are the supplies (logistics) and unit rotations. How to do this when Russian aviation dominates the sky? Yes, they managed to shoot down a few aggressor helicopters, but the SU still holds air superiority. Ukraine needs not only strict air defense of its troops, but also road and center cover for aviation and missiles. A longer operation will require sacrifices and resources from Ukraine (remember Klinkus).

A Ukrainian brigade-sized force (especially if the above conditions are successfully met) could distract part of the Russian reserve forces from the Kharkov direction (alone Russian units in the reserve have reportedly already been transferred).

Three regiments are enough for the invaders to capture Ukrainian units and launch a counterattack. Judging from public information, the invaders of the “Northern” joint group will be able to quickly crush these units, but their combat capabilities may be very limited.

Therefore, it cannot be excluded that the aggressor could withdraw combat units from the Kharkov direction along with these reserves, for example: the 155th Marine Brigade, the 83rd Amphibious Assault Brigade assigned to the Joint Group “North”, as well as the 2nd Spec. Destination Brigade.

Perhaps the purpose of this Ukrainian operation is to withdraw these or other troops close to the contact line in the direction of Kharkov, and then increase pressure on the Lipsy and Vovchansk regions and drive out the aggressors?

But in this case, can the Ukrainians really quickly achieve their goals in the Kharkov direction? Even if a few Russian troops are drawn from the reserve or the front line, the Ukrainian defenders still do not have an advantage in manpower and firepower.

Of course, retreat is possible without this plan (if there was one), but it is not so easy to withdraw a battalion, two or even a whole brigade from the line of contact (in combat), especially when the aggressor has air superiority.

Such a “walking on horseback” and risks would be understandable if the situation in the Pokrovsk direction was not particularly difficult. But now, on the line of contact with the main force of the invaders, brigade-sized units with artillery support and, above all, air defense will be more useful than ever.

Is now the best time to pay a high price for the Kremlin’s essentially limited military effects and significant reputational damage, which the aggressor can turn into self-serving propaganda (“the Motherland is in danger”)?

“Time will tell, good luck Ukraine”, the experts wrote in their commentary.