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Although the Russian army Stuck in Ukrainewhose mercenaries are The situation in Africa is not much better.
In late July 2024, Wagner Group, a Moscow-aligned private military companyAccompanying the Malian army, which the Malian regime calls “Stable operation“The town of Tinzaouaten is located in the northeast of the West African country, close to the Algerian border.
This task will soon Walking sideways At the time, fighting broke out between the alliance and rebels from the Tuareg separatist group the Permanent Strategic Framework.
While retreating, Wagner and the Malian troops were ambushed by militants from an al-Qaeda affiliate. Muslim Nusrat Jamia Milleniaor JNIM.
More than 80 Wagner personnel and more than 40 Malian soldiers Reportedly killed in battleCasualties include Nikita Fedyaninwho runs Wagner’s popular Telegram Channel Gray Area.
although Tuareg rebels and Nature and implementation Quickly celebrating their success, Mari and Wagner Trying to downplay Their losses.
This is understandable. The failure of Tinzavatten puts both the Wagner Group and Russia in a difficult position. It sends a signal to African leaders that they have Moscow-backed mercenaries as partners in counter-terrorism and regime protectors, especially in a complex security environment like Mali. But it also challenges Moscow African Continental Strategy.
since Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin diesIn August 2023, Moscow attempted to establish Afrika KorpsThis is a Wagner-like project controlled by the Ministry of Defense. The project aims to convert the Wagner fighter into a Directly under command and control Russian country.
But this has proven more challenging than Moscow expected, complicating Russia’s plans to expand its partnerships across Africa through support from private military companies.
The Tinzawateng incident was a major blow to Wagner, the largest known casualty incident in Africa. As background, in Wagner’s nearly ten years Counter-terrorism mission The French stationed in Mali lost 59 SoldiersFrance’s counter-terrorism policy in Mali has fueled discontent among the military, leading to There were several coups in 2020 and 2021This also laid the foundation for Mali’s coup leaders to seek security guarantees from Wagner rather than Paris.
Since entering Mali in December 2021 – especially in Death of Prigozhin – Wagner’s army achieved some victories. In November, Russian mercenaries helped the Malian army Recapture of Kidala separatist stronghold.
This success may have led to overconfidence; as the Tinzawateng incident shows, there are very real security challenges across Mali, and Wagner’s strategy, including Indiscriminate violence and targeting of civiliansis far from the most effective tool to resolve Mali’s security crisis.
While the Tinza Uteng incident was Wagner’s largest known loss in Africa, it was not the first. Back in 2019, Wagner troops were caught in a stalemate due to over-commitment and Underdelivery During a brief counter-terrorism operation in Mozambique.
In this situation, Wagner lasted only a few months before withdrawing its forces, as it became clear that it was under-equipped, ill-prepared, and too indifferent to its local military partners in Mozambique.
While recent events in Mali are different, Wagner’s abandonment of Mozambique could weigh on Mali’s military leaders following the group’s recent setbacks.
There are many questions about whether Wagner or his successor, the Afrika Korps, will continue to invest in Mali’s security.
There is still a possibility Tensions rise There are disagreements between the Malian army and its Russian partners over security missions and who is calling the shots. Testing this relationship Now, this can also lead to friction and Other issues that may arise in the future.
Russia has tried to ease concerns following the Tinzavatten attack. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been in touch with his Malian counterpart. Reaffirming Russia’s commitment For this country.
But that’s easier said than done. Whether the Kremlin plans to compensate for the loss of Wagner by deploying more personnel remains an open question. More importantly, the problems plaguing Mali cannot be solved by the barrel of a gun, and both Moscow and Mali’s current regime have proven themselves uninterested in non-military solutions — such as negotiations with non-state actors — to real or perceived security threats.
Russia’s actions in Mali are far from altruistic. Mali is Africa The fourth largest producer Gold. Like Wagner, Moscow also wants a piece of this market. In November 2023, Russia Signed the agreement Partnering with Mali to build the country’s largest gold refinery.
On the surface, this would appear to be a boost to Mali’s economy, but the timeline for the project is unclear. Russia’s counter-narrative.
However, there is one case where Wagner has benefited from his recent setback. Some Security Expert Some in Africa’s Sahel region note that the losses may actually help Wagner’s reputation among Mali’s military leaders and the Malian people; a willingness to fight alongside a partner and to fight bloody battles is a strong signal.
For countries such as Mali, which have long been wary of foreign intervention, Wagner’s willingness to engage in combat and take on missions that France and Western security partners are reluctant to perform has resonated with some of the population.
Wagner’s setback in Mali may have another unexpected benefit for Moscow.
A few days after the incident, a spokesman for Ukraine’s military intelligence service hinted that Ukraine may have played a role. Providing intelligence to Tuareg groups.
This message – both in gesture and in fact – led Mali Severing diplomatic relations With Ukraine. Neighboring Niger And quickly followed suit.
Ukraine has since Strongly deny participate.
Regardless, the dynamic illustrates how widespread the rivalry between Moscow and Kiev has become.
Ukraine would benefit from Wagner’s failure in Africa, forcing Wagner’s clients to consider the value of their partnership with Moscow. But as the reaction in Mali shows, such efforts are clearly counterproductive.
Even so, for Russia, Wagner’s loss presents more challenges than opportunities.
Moscow may Reasons for Wagner’s failure in Africaespecially when it tries to use Afrika Korps.
The Kremlin can no longer easily explain the events of late July. John LechnerExperts who study Wagner and Russian security say Moscow allows the Wagner brand to continue in Mali in part to give Russia cover for such security lapses.
How long Moscow can continue this pageantry — denying that Wagner’s failure is also a Russian failure, especially against the Malian government — is open to question.
While the Malian military sees clear value in contracting Wagner, at some point the mission needs to expand, or incidents like Tinzawateng could become more common. This is especially likely if the Malian army seeks to continue expanding its counterinsurgency mission.
Moscow certainly does not want to jeopardize its relationship with the leaders of the coup in Bamako, Mali. But it is also maintaining a delicate balance, carefully avoiding empowering the remnants of Wagner in any meaningful way, as this could lead the group to take actions contrary to Moscow’s interests in Africa and elsewhere.
In addition, the ambitious goal of recruiting tens of thousands of African Corps personnel has been Reportedly severely insufficientlimiting Moscow’s options.
So while the Tinzawateng incident provides a glimpse into Mali’s very dire security environment, it also highlights the limitations of relying on Russian mercenaries – whether they are under the Wagner banner or restructured under Russia’s Afrika Korps.
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