Partial solutions mean more wars in the future – Nassif Evan

More than ten months after the Gaza war, all the parties concerned and international and regional powers still raise the same questions and inquiries about the developments and possible scenarios, which seem timely and open, even if it has been so far relatively limited. Possible scenarios include intermittent truces, fragile armistices, a long war of attrition, or a move toward a widespread and open regional war. If the influential international parties, led by the United States, can prevent Israel from adopting a strategy of involving Washington and other powers in a regional war, the impact of which is still dangerous and unknown, both for the people of the region and for the regional interests of the international parties with important influence, then there is a different form of role for international parties or mediators, who cannot prevent small-scale wars in their regions, which exist in various forms and are interconnected between their domains. This war has witnessed the change or gradual decline of many red lines in the rules of the game governing conflicts on the ground before the Gaza war. After the Doha conference last Thursday and Friday, Washington announced the beginning of bridging or narrowing the differences. This optimism is betting on the success of the diplomatic campaign that began immediately after the Doha conference and the arrival of the US Secretary of State in Israel on Sunday to prepare for the Cairo conference, which is the continuation of the Doha conference this week. The United States has bet on successfully pushing Israel to give up two conditions to establish full security and military control over the Gaza Strip. The first involves the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphia axis to control the Palestinian (Gaza)-Egypt border; the second involves control of the Nezarim corridor, or the division of Gaza into two parts: that is, the transition to control the north and south of Gaza. This bet remains difficult or almost impossible to push the Netanyahu government to accept without effective international pressure and other pressures that complement each other and force Israel to accept this bet. Of course, these Israeli conditions cannot be accepted by the Palestinian or Arab forces concerned, nor can they participate in negotiations in various forms.

In addition to the “policy”, Israel is dismembering the West Bank and creating conditions of pressure and expulsion for its people by increasing settlement activity, thus excluding the possibility of successfully reaching a real truce as a first step. Settlers have repeatedly attacked Palestinian citizens, forcing them to be forcibly relocated. The attack on the courtyard of the Al-Aqsa Mosque last Tuesday, on the occasion of the “first anniversary of the destruction of the Temple”, is another sign of the completion of the policy of Judaization of the West Bank. This policy is undoubtedly a preparation for the upcoming major conflict, which increases the complexity of the proposed “truce policy” and exposes the fragility of the latter. In addition, Israel considers the “security in northern Israel” document to be completely separate from the Gaza issue, and if an agreement is reached on the Gaza issue, it does not mean accepting the return of the situation on the Lebanese front to the previous state. In exchange for the strategy of “arena unity”, Israel is implementing a strategy of separating the Palestinian and Lebanese “arenas”. True, as we have pointed out, reaching a truce on the Palestinian front, although difficult, will help reduce the conflict on the Lebanese front, but according to the Israeli concept, it will not prevent the conflict. Lebanon calls for the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, but the realities on the ground and the existing facts of the conflict make it difficult for the resolution to be fully implemented within a reasonable time. What could be achieved if a long-term truce was reached under the fragile rubric of a ceasefire on the Gaza front, a new, unwritten understanding organized and guaranteed by a “third party” to govern a new status quo on Lebanon’s southern border, similar to what existed before.

In order to avoid the continued opening of the conflict and its escalation, which brings different risks to the entire region, the international powers must enforce a comprehensive ceasefire through the Security Council. In the ongoing war: As we have seen, the fronts of this war are intertwined and can be expanded vertically and horizontally, which can be used for power games in the region, bringing huge risks to regional peace and security. A comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire is a necessary condition, but of course not a sufficient condition, because it will be necessary to take effective international actions afterwards to open the path of comprehensive and lasting peace on the basis of relevant and known international resolutions and the two-state solution. This is something that does not come with too many difficulties, but if achieved, it is the only thing that can provide security, peace and stability in the basic strategic geography of the region.