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In Lima, caudillos or families rule many of the city’s districts. In my new book, The Persistence of Local Leaders in Latin America: Informal Political Practices and Democracy in Unitary States, I understand caudillos as mayors who have served three or more terms and use informal political practices to stay in power. These mayors have received complaints from the media, judicial authorities, or residents of their districts alleging corruption, nepotism, cronyism, abuse of power, pressure on local media, or harassment of the political opposition.
These informal political practices (IPPs) are a common basis for their exercise of power. But how do they keep them in office? The book shows that chiefs use these practices, most importantly, to strengthen their electoral base in the regions, but also to control and weaken the political opposition and suppress other local actors that might harm their chances of re-election.
The phenomenon of the head of state is not unique to Lima or Peru. Local leaders and clans rule many cities in Latin America. In fact, over the past two decades, they have governed more than 20% of the metropolitan areas of Santiago (Chile), Asuncion (Paraguay), and the Peruvian capital itself. Local democracy is in trouble.
Combining electoral data and public complaints against the PPI, the book shows that in the 42 districts of Lima province, nearly a quarter of electoral periods were ruled by caciques and family clans from 2002 to 2018. The book analyzes in depth the cases of Augusto Miyashiro (Chorrillos) and Felipe Castillo (Los Olivos), the most representative cases of caciques and family politics in the Lima municipal government.
Perhaps counterintuitively, leaders in Peru and other countries in the region left office through their own fault. These mayors enjoy considerable autonomy, while different layers of the political system lack control over them. State institutions are weak and lack institutional capacity or direct interest in regional political dynamics. Local councils have limited power, city governments are mayor-centric, and the automatic majority for the winning party does not help the small political opposition that exists. Civil society, key to denouncing these practices and promoting alternative candidates, is divided or co-opted by the mayors.
The ban on reelection has not changed the use of these practices much. On the contrary, it has made abuses of power more frequent, made politics (even) more of a family matter, and promoted puppet candidates imposed by (former) mayors who cannot run for reelection. This is, in fact, what we see in several districts of Lima.
While not all mayors are leaders, institutional design and contextual factors make them leaders. Many attempt but fail to achieve subsequent reelection, often because they govern in a way that is “too particular” and does not even benefit their electoral base, or because their abuses of power are “too egregious.”
Beyond the classic cases of heads of state and clans, we need more media attention to local political dynamics, a larger democratic mission for political parties, and better tools to analyze mayors’ progress in local management and performance, as this book also shows that we are running out of examples of periods of “good government.”
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