NATO’s Dilemma – Foreign Patrols

When any institution – a university, a company, a research centre, even a couple – reaches its 75th anniversary, we expect to hear about a list of achievements during its long lifetime, and a NATO summit is inevitable, and Washington is no exception.

However, the current dilemma facing NATO cannot be ignored. The possibility of Donald Trump becoming the US president again increases, Hungary’s Viktor Orban remains a disruptive force, and Europe and the United States are at odds over the war between Israel and Hamas, China, the regulation of digital technology, and cybersecurity. Ways to help Ukraine against Russia.

Some might say this is nothing new. The alliance has faced serious crises in its history. For example, throughout the Cold War, disagreements over military doctrine (particularly the role of nuclear weapons) strained the alliance, and Germany and France openly opposed the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and every U.S. president from Dwight Eisenhower to Trump has complained about Europe’s tendency to not be protected by the United States. So it’s fair to say that the issues today are pretty much the same.

However, the situation within the alliance today is markedly different from previous tensions, as what threatens NATO’s future goes beyond the personal inclinations of the leaders (Trump or Marine Le Pen). In fact, their views and the growing acceptance of them are the real factors.

To put it more precisely, nations form alliances primarily to counter common threats, and when NATO was founded in 1949, the Soviet Union seemed to pose a threat to its European members. It made sense for the United States to commit to defending those regions and maintain a large military presence there. But those days are over. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are over, and Russia is no longer in a position to invade and conquer the European continent. True, it is waging an illegal war in Ukraine and may one day threaten the small Baltic states, but the idea that Russian troops intend to wage war on Poland and head for the English Channel is a laughable one. A military focused on confronting a smaller, weaker Ukraine will not turn to regional expansionism, even if Vladimir Putin harbors such ambitions.

At the same time, China is a competitor of the United States and the world’s largest trading nation. Asia now accounts for a much larger share of the global economy (54%) than Europe (17%) and contributes more to global economic growth. For this reason, and for purely structural reasons, Asia today receives more attention from the United States and Europe receives less attention. This does not mean that Europe is no longer important, but that it is no longer at the forefront of American strategic interests.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO members have spent years coming up with new rationales and missions. The problem is, most of these new efforts have worked poorly. Today, expectations that NATO expansion would lead to a Europe “whole, free, and at peace” ring somewhat hollow, especially as a brutal war rages in Ukraine and relations with Russia are in a deep freeze. Although NATO members rallied behind the United States after the September 11 attacks—the first and only time Article 5 was invoked—the alliance’s subsequent so-called nation-building efforts in Afghanistan were unsuccessful and costly. The 2011 joint British, French, and American intervention in Libya was not a NATO operation, but was a clear example of transatlantic security cooperation, and the result was yet another failed state. And while NATO helped Ukraine survive a Russian invasion and defend much of its territory, the war is unlikely to end with the clear victory that NATO celebrates. So, given this record, we can understand why there is growing skepticism about its value.

Finally, common cliches about shared values ​​and transatlantic solidarity no longer resonate as strongly as they once did, especially among younger generations. The percentage of Americans (both men and women) of European descent is declining, leading to an erosion of emotional ties to the “motherland,” while events like World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall seem ancient history to both men and women. Citizens who came of age during the war on terror or the 2008 financial crisis have become more politically conscious about climate change than about power politics. Not surprisingly, then, young Americans are less convinced by claims of “American exceptionalism” and less willing to support an active international role. None of this bodes well for security partnerships that still rely heavily on the United States acting as a first responder when things go wrong.

This does not mean that NATO will collapse, even if Trump is re-elected president and more populists come to power in Europe. But there are structural forces that are gradually alienating Europe and the United States, and these trends will continue no matter what happens next November, or in Ukraine, or in Europe itself. So the only important question is to what extent this divergence may persist.

Stephen Walter

Foreign Policy Magazine

Translation and summary: Yasmine Abdel Latif