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This week, the introduction of an amendment to Bhutan’s parliamentary bill that would give individual MPs the power to initiate a vote of no confidence against MP Lhunje Drumtsog raises serious constitutional questions and threatens the stability of Bhutan’s democratic system. Not only would the amendment fundamentally alter the delicate balance of power enshrined in Bhutan’s constitution, it could also lead to government instability and failure.
The Constitution of Bhutan, like many modern democratic constitutions, is based on the principle of separation of powers. Article 1(3) of the Constitution clearly states: “The Executive, Legislative and Judiciary shall be separate powers, and no powers shall be infringed upon one another except as provided in this Constitution.” This clear division of powers is not just a theoretical construct, but a practical safeguard against the concentration of power and potential tyranny.
The proposed amendments to the Act of Parliament would allow MPs to directly challenge the position of the Executive Minister. This is a significant departure from the current constitutional framework, which vests executive power in county governments headed by the Prime Minister. According to Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, “Executive power shall be vested in the county governments headed by the Prime Minister”.
The Constitution provides for a specific mechanism to check executive power, namely a vote of no confidence in the government as a whole, rather than in individual ministers. This procedure is outlined in Articles 17(6) and (7), which require a motion by at least one-third of the members of Parliament to be passed by a two-thirds majority in order to dissolve the government. This high threshold ensures that such serious action can only be taken if there is substantial consensus in the legislature.
It is important to emphasize that even the constitutional mechanism for a vote of no confidence in the government should not be initiated by individual members of Congress. Allowing individual members to initiate such votes could lead to abuse of power, where opposition or disgruntled members (including those from the ruling party) could disrupt government operations and undermine democratic stability.
It is important to understand that under the current constitutional framework, the appointment of Lt. Gen. Lhunje is determined by the Prime Minister. Article 17 (3) of the Constitution states that “the King of Bhutan shall appoint Ministers from among the Members of Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister and dismiss Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister.” This provision clearly states that the power to appoint and dismiss Ministers lies with the Prime Minister, not Parliament.
The Lunger Jungjo Law 2021 already provides ample grounds for the Prime Minister to remove any minister. The Act reinforces the constitutional principle of executive power and provides a mechanism to address ministerial performance issues within the executive branch. This existing framework ensures accountability while maintaining the separation of powers and stability of government.
Bhutan’s young democracy has made significant progress in establishing a robust system of checks and balances. It is critical that any proposed changes to this system carefully consider constitutional principles and the need for government stability. The separation of powers and the stability of democratic governance must be protected from well-intentioned but potentially harmful encroachments.
Sonam Tsering
Lawyer, Thimphu
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
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