Expectations for new Indonesia-Australia defense treaty lowered

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BOGOR, West Java (ANTARA) – It was a historic day when Indonesia and Australia finally finalized negotiations for a new treaty-level defense agreement on Tuesday, August 20, 2024. The soon-to-be-signed treaty, which Australian Defense Minister Richard Marrs called the “most important agreement” between the two countries, is expected to support more ambitious joint exercises and provide greater interoperability between the two countries’ defense forces.

The two countries’ defense ministers are expected to sign the treaty in Jakarta later this month, but the specific details of the treaty remain unclear. While the new treaty is expected to greatly enhance defense cooperation, it is also important to understand what not to expect so that unrealistic expectations can be controlled.

In light of this, it is important to emphasize that the treaty is unlikely to lead to a military alliance between Indonesia and Australia. Any attempt at an alliance would be complicated by the clear strategic differences between the two countries in their views on the growing challenges in the region, especially the great power competition between China and the United States.

Indonesia and Australia also have obvious differences in their views on the intensification of strategic competition between China and the United States. Indonesia has long pursued a “non-aligned” policy and is unwilling to choose sides.

Jakarta does not view China as an obvious military threat, nor does it fully accept the United States as a benign security provider in the region. At the same time, Canberra recognizes the potential threat posed by China to the US-led regional order that is the foundation of the country’s security and prosperity.

In response, Canberra has adapted its defence strategy to counter China’s ability to project power into Australia’s neighbourhood and redoubled its alliance with the US – most notably through the recent AUKUS partnership.

As for Indonesia, there are clear disagreements among key decision makers about the nature and extent of the potential threat from China, which prevents Indonesia from aligning with the United States or Australia. Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s main concerns about China are economic, as China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner and a major source of foreign investment, which President Widodo needs for his infrastructure development.

Indonesia has taken a tough stance against China’s incursion into the Natuna Islands over the past few years, mainly to reassure its domestic public that it is committed to defending the country’s territorial integrity and to mitigate potential backlash against Chinese investment. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also avoided taking a stance against China, as it is keen to maintain Indonesia’s neutrality in order to advance Indonesia’s role as an “honest mediator” in the South China Sea dispute.

However, the Indonesian Navy and Army view China as a potential threat of a very different nature. The Navy sees China as an external threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity near the Natuna Islands, which must be addressed by strengthening Indonesia’s naval capabilities. The Army sees China as a potential threat primarily ideologically, so the remedy should be to strengthen Indonesia’s internal security.

As for Australia, although official documents avoid explicitly identifying China as the main threat, Canberra’s newly released 2024 National Defense Strategy is clearly aimed at potential threats from the Asian giant. The strategic competition between China and the United States is identified as the main security challenge facing Australia in the region.

China’s growing military capabilities, including in cutting-edge defence technology, have eroded Australia’s key strategic advantage of geographic proximity. This, combined with China’s increasing assertiveness, including the use of coercive strategies to pursue its interests in the region, poses a real threat to the US-led regional rules-based order that has been the foundation of Australia’s security and prosperity since the end of World War II.

In response to the Chinese threat, Australia is seeking to implement a denial defense strategy in the country’s northern region to prevent or, if necessary, defeat the adversary from projecting power into the area surrounding Australia. If Australia can obtain Indonesia’s cooperation, the denial strategy in the northern region will be more effective because Indonesia controls strategic waterways that are vital to Australia’s sea lines of communication.

However, it is highly unlikely that the upcoming defense treaty between Indonesia and Australia will include this scope of cooperation. As mentioned earlier, the new defense agreement is not intended to establish a military alliance between the two countries. Indonesia’s threat perception of China is different from Australia’s. Jakarta currently has little need or interest in establishing joint combat capabilities with Australia against China, as its policymakers have not even agreed to designate China as a threat.

Not a military alliance

Judging from Indonesia and Australia’s views on the United States, a military alliance between the two countries is unlikely. Australia considers its alliance with the United States to be a key factor in guaranteeing its security. This fact has become more evident in recent years as Canberra and Washington have deepened their defense relationship through a series of enhanced military posture agreements and AUKUS.

These agreements will not only strengthen technical cooperation between the two countries, including allowing Australia to procure nuclear-powered submarines, but will also enhance the United States’ ability to project power into the region by opening up Australian bases to U.S. strategic bombers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. In this context, Australia clearly believes that the U.S. military presence in the region is beneficial to its security interests.

But this is not the case in Indonesia. The United States is currently regarded as an important security partner by Indonesia. Washington has helped Indonesia meet several key security needs, especially in the training and education of military personnel and the supply of advanced weapon systems, including fighter jets, missiles and attack helicopters.

However, while Indonesia sees the United States as an important security partner, it does not believe, nor does it want the United States to be a security provider in the region. Jakarta’s long-standing security interest is to ensure that its immediate strategic environment in Southeast Asia is not disturbed by external powers, which is mainly achieved through ASEAN and carefully balancing relations between competing powers. In Jakarta’s view, increasing the US presence in the region will not necessarily enhance regional security, but may lead to instability, as it may provoke competitors (in this case China) to also increase their presence in the region.

In addition, Indonesian civilian and military officials have questions about their trust in the U.S. Indonesia’s historical grievances with the U.S., such as U.S. involvement in supporting regional insurgencies in Indonesia during the Cold War and Washington’s arms embargo on the Indonesian military over human rights violations in East Timor, have led to lingering suspicions about U.S. intentions toward Indonesia.

Differences between Indonesia and Australia in their views of the two most important geopolitical players in the region, China and the United States, also suggest that a military alliance between the two countries remains unlikely at this time. Without resolving these differences, establishing a military alliance at this time would require Indonesia or Australia to make significant sacrifices in their strategic and security interests.

Nonetheless, even without a military alliance, the upcoming defense treaty should be a welcome development for both sides. We look forward to the publication of the final draft of the treaty, but there are already several areas where cooperation can be deepened to benefit both countries, such as education, training, and joint exercises; technical exchanges and defense industry partnerships; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; or addressing common security issues, such as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations.

Whatever form of defense cooperation the new treaty entails, we can be confident that closer defense ties between Jakarta and Canberra will only help strengthen the security of both countries and the region.

*) Muhammad Teguh Ariffaiz Nasution, LPDP recipient and Master of Strategic Studies graduate from the Australian National University (ANU)

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of ANTARA News Agency.

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