Despite Lopez Obrador, the US gets what it wants

If the founder of the meeting processIn 2010, Julio Scherer García and Ismael Zambada made then-President Felipe Calderón ridiculous by going after drug kingpins, and Mayo’s presence on U.S. soil is similarly grotesque and outrageous for López Obrador’s government.

Neither Calderón’s unconditional, shameful collaboration with the United States nor López Obrador’s restrictions on American institutions have prevented their governments from being overwhelmed by the actions of Mexico’s last historic drug-trafficking boss.

Under Calderón, U.S. security and intelligence services, both civilian and military, did whatever they wanted. They spied, detained people, planted cases, led armed operations, compiled files, laundered money, imprisoned, and took people out of Mexico. But they could not stop Zambada García.

There was an escape attempt at the end of Calderón’s six-year term, but neither the army nor Gennaro García Luna’s federal police arrived in time when the operation began, giving him time to flee.

As far as we know, López Obrador did not even go looking for him, even though Security and Citizen Protection Minister Rosa Isela Rodríguez announced four arrest warrants against Zambada when he was already out of the country.

Security cooperation with the United States has been reduced to a minimum under López Obrador’s government, and the DEA, for its part, has imposed formal restrictions on the agents it deploys in Mexico, in stark contrast to its fawning over Washington on immigration issues.

Bilateral security efforts were effectively frozen as the Mexican president refused to engage in any operations with the United States and shelved recommendations made to him by the State Department.

In addition, at the beginning of his administration, he submitted a national security law reform to the Senate in December 2020 to restrict the actions of foreign agents in the country and punish actions that go beyond formal agreements.

The main measure, according to the law approved by the Senate, is that when it is proven that a foreign agent has corrupted, detained or kidnapped a national and handed him over to the justice of another country, any cooperation agreement on this matter will be canceled; in addition, those responsible will be prosecuted in Mexico.

Despite the rejection and formal restrictions on cooperation, mainly at the Ministry of Justice, in the end the country’s authorities got what they wanted most: the head of the Sinaloa drug cartel, whom they considered the most hated person of the moment due to the health crisis caused by fentanyl trafficking.

Without a formal understanding of what happened, because he was put in the role of victim and awaiting the report requested by Washington, the president suggested that nothing Zambada claimed would affect his government.

He has already done so, although he has not yet begun testifying. The case is now in the hands of Justice Department prosecutors, but the president has rejected it. The paradox of power.