Palestinian reconciliation…Chinese mediation…and old assumptions – The Palestinian Question

Palestinians usually yawn when they hear news about reconciliation talks between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, but last Monday there was a slight change. The two Palestinian organizations that were going to hold talks in China issued a joint statement. No one here is optimistic that these fruitless negotiations, which have been going on for nearly two decades, will now achieve a historic turning point, but curiosity is growing based on two particular points: the sharp wording of the brief statement signed by the 14 Palestinian factions; the names of “Hamas” and “Fatah” on it, and the central role of China, which has so far had very limited interference in Palestinian affairs and negotiations.

This summary statement is harsh compared to everything that has been issued in the framework of the uncountable reconciliation projects over the years. The statement confirms the willingness to establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital in accordance with UN Resolution 194 (refugee return), but does not mention the borders of the future state and its relationship with Israel (which the document describes as a “Zionist enemy”), except for the need to commit to a political agreement, an issue that in the past was a source of disagreement between the Authority and Hamas. In addition, the statement praises all forms of resistance against the “occupation” and emphasizes the need to form a national unity government that will also govern the region “the day after the war.”

This statement involves the intersection of three parties’ interests. The authority represented by the Fatah movement seems to be intent on suppressing international criticism, and its reputation has seriously declined compared to the Hamas movement, which currently leads the Palestinian regime. The authority now needs a reconciliation campaign as a means of consolidating its internal legitimacy and ensuring its seat in the framework of the “second day after the war” discussion.

Hamas also needs to take this step for similar reasons. Reconciliation makes it more important as a major player in the “future” and distances it from the image of an excluded party that must be eliminated, as proclaimed by Israel. Moreover, this event strengthens the legitimacy within Hamas, as it shows that Hamas is trying to heal the internal rifts, which is a very painful national issue for the Palestinian people. Of course, all this cannot be achieved without Hamas loosening its grip on the Gaza Strip. At best, Hamas will agree to a symbolic government, while behind the scenes it will continue to tighten its control over every sphere of life there.

The third and most important one in this triangle of interests is China, which is trying to strengthen its power in the Middle East while watching with satisfaction the decline of the US star in the region, as evidenced by the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, the refusal to adopt a strict military policy towards Iran, and the tensions with Arab countries. About a year ago, China had an inspiring success in promoting a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia while building economic, military and political relations with countries in the region. In addition to ports and natural treasures that are vital to the Chinese economy, oil is also the most worrying issue.

At least for now, there is no expectation that the decisions of the declaration will be implemented quickly, especially regarding the establishment of a national unity government, due to the deep hostility and suspicion between Fatah and Hamas. However, Israel must remain cautious and vigilant about two issues that this development embodies. First: this event may be considered attractive by the international community, which is eager to find a solution to the Gaza conflict, especially if it is proposed on the basis of the Palestinian Authority. Israel faces international pressure, which may be accompanied by demands to stop the war and allow the Authority to work in the Gaza Strip, which will allow “Hamas” to continue to exist and exert influence. ” The second reason for concern is the increase in Chinese intervention in the region. China has clearly adopted a position in support of the Palestinian side, while having strong reservations about Israel and seeking to become an alternative to US hegemony in the region.

Israel must stop spreading accusations on the international stage (and among local parties in Israel) to the effect that reconciliation represents the possibility of achieving stability in the Palestinian Authority, strengthening its authority, and perhaps establishing a “Hamas” and turn it towards moderation. Every previous statement has been influenced by a misunderstanding of reality and remains mired in the false assumptions that prevailed in Israel before October 7.

At this stage, Israel must work to clarify the irreversible nature of Hamas and the irrationality of its transformation into part of the future Palestinian Authority. Israel must also make it clear that, even if it seeks to reach an agreement with Hamas as soon as possible, Israel does not intend to end the long struggle aimed at eradicating the organization. On the other hand, Israel must seek other ways to divert the Authority from this negative path of reconciliation, and for this, it must consider stopping economic punitive measures against the Authority and even possibly launching the first political dialogue between the two parties. All this must be done with the wisdom that, although the Authority is a problematic factor, its survival is much better than the chaos that its absence will bring to the scene, and the survival of the Authority is also much better than Israel being forced to rule the West Bank through direct military rule, which is, of course, much better than the option of Hamas ruling the West Bank.

Michael Milstein

Novaya Gazeta

Palestine Institute