“Terrorism” and its social incubator | Alexander Salon

Ismail Al-Iskandarani’s article was published in its full edition in As-Safir Arabia supplement on Thursday, February 6, 2014, and: Appendix Site On the link:

http://goo.gl/jejOkb

There is no evidence to support the accusation that the Muslim Brotherhood killed young people for blood, nor that the authorities invoked the Algerian scenario, nor that the regular forces killed their own soldiers in order to claim imaginary terrorism. On the other hand, it is clear that the authorities killed opponents with excessive violence, and there was an armed rebellion against the regular forces and terrorist activities against civilians. The discussion here is not about the fabrication or creation of terrorism, but about the necessity of terrorism, not only at the level of power, but also in terms of the rules that support the repression of terrorism and welcome state violence.
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What is terrorism?

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The call by General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the Egyptian Minister of Defense, on July 24 to rally in support of his mission to confront violence and “latent terrorism” was more explicit and frank than analysts had imagined. The idea of ​​vetoing the mandate, instead of stopping at… The required formula presupposes the occurrence of terrorism, in fact paving the way for demands and calls for terrorism. At that time, there were no terrorist incidents against civilians, or incidents of indifference to the presence of civilians on the battlefields of clashes with regular troops. The voices of warning against the “terrorist industry” were growing louder, with excessive repression and successive massacres at the “Republican Guardhouse”, the “Monument”, and the dispersal of sit-ins in Rabaa and Nahda Square. But the successive months began to expose the existence of the so-called “terrorism”, not only at the level of the authorities, but also at the level of the population. “Terrorism” is the celebration of the emergence of all kinds of latent, hidden and postponed terrorism, with a real desire to exploit terrorism for political and security purposes.

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As for the “terrorist industry”, it can only be understood in terms of repressive policies that help push extremists ideologically and politically to choose violence supported by increasingly extremist ideas, because these policies justify their violent tendencies. Fabricating terrorist incidents can be part of this industry, whether it is to attribute fabricated incidents to existing or fictitious organizations, or to infiltrate some organizations to involve them in terrorist acts, justify the repressive policies and violent rhetoric of the authorities, and the repressive tendencies of the authorities will certainly not stop at the borders of terrorist organizations. “Terrorism” is a kind of public opinion, not just a dictatorial will. It involves three clues, namely: the intergenerational incubator of the discourse of the war on terror, the political crisis. The speech of Islamists and the stimulation of propaganda media become the link between authority and the masses.

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A generational incubator of authoritarianism

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One of the most important differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is that the former was interested in building a social incubator for their so-called “jihadists”, while the polar wing of the Islamic State pushed its members to “uphold their faith” and break with “pre-Islamic society”. Although an example belonging to a different context was cited, the “yes” vote in the referendum was driven by an intense, one-way public sphere propaganda. The constitutional amendment can be understood as a kind of local competition between those with ambitions in the upcoming parliamentary elections. But this pragmatic explanation of financial/political spending does not counter the hysteria that prevailed during the voting process.

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Some of the crowds may have been hired by the authorities to create false support, but we cannot ignore the carnival scenes, in which support was combined with opposition to the Brotherhood and “terrorism”, chanting the national slogan “Egypt above all”, and chanting the national slogan of Qatar. Song, with a strong populist operetta “Let it go”. Generational biases were evident in the referendum on constitutional amendments held at the beginning of this year. These biases were exacerbated by the comments of voters, who were in the majority among the elderly, as evidenced by video recordings circulating on social media networks, some of which were broadcast live on satellite channels. Some of them made hostile statements about the younger generation and its choices about freedom, rights and democracy, many of them danced at the gates of the polling stations, and were generally keen to take photos with uniformed men from the regular army. Make sure the polling stations are safe.

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As expressed during the two days of the referendum, the overall situation seems to be dominated by two generations: the “old” generation, which is generally imbued with the anti-terrorist and Islamist discourse of the Mubarak regime, which reached its peak in the 1990s, and the “old” generation, whose consciousness was formed during the period of nationalist Nasserist propaganda and who identify with the rule of the military.

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The crisis of authoritative discourse in Islam
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Shortly before June 30, a follower of the deposed president Mohamed Morsi, who was broadcasting a meeting in support of the Syrian revolution at a stadium in Cairo, was visibly horrified. “Why are they all singing? Songs that we don’t know?” he asked in horror. It was not only songs with bloody lyrics such as “Here is the Islam of Heroism” that showed the Islamists as a sect distinct from the rest of the people, brought in by the money that rules him, but also the bluntness of the deposed president’s rhetoric of “his stupid right and his blatant lies” that reinforced the rhetorical and psychological separation between the “sect” and the people. On the other hand, the army did succeed in using words that were close to the masses. In late 2012, leaked recordings of a meeting between the defense minister and some military leaders revealed that the ministry was keen to retain the military spokesman, Colonel Ahmed Mohamed Ali, because of his popularity among women. It seems that this strategy of specifically targeting an audience of military supporters, including housewives and mothers, achieved clear results in open flirtations in the media and on television, and reached its peak during the two days of the referendum, when women’s participation was high. Very high, including expressions of the response Sisi wanted… As a person, the public response to the military – old men and women – stopped at political and security support. In fact, one of the mothers became so. She reported her son as a member of the April 6 movement, expelled the lawyer who defended him, and supported her claims with the evidence she submitted to convict her son.

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Although this is an uncommon form of extremism, according to eyewitness reports, the speech of the mother in the hall of the police station is common in the homes of many revolutionary youths who, in family disagreements with their parents, accuse him of collusion. The “nationalist” (semi-fascist) movement seeks to awaken the authoritarian populist rhetoric of “celebrating” terrorist events (whether real or fabricated) in order to strengthen its power. Its position is based on calling on the old state to defeat the change. The masses know that this politically defeated group, which was toppled from power and then suffered the largest political massacre in Egypt’s contemporary history, has not yet been judicially proven to have participated in activities that can be classified as terrorists on this basis. But the excitement of the humiliation makes the public ignore the fact that the government has not declared “Ansar Bayit al-Maqdisi” a terrorist organization, on the contrary, the authorities are content to repeat the accusation that it is “loyal to the terrorist Brotherhood organization,” although it is he who claims responsibility for the bombings in South Sinai, Dakhliya and the Cairo Security Agency, and not the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a blatantly collusive process that reductively categorizes individuals and groups: either they are good patriots who support the army and favor constitutional amendments, or they are enemies of the motherland, traitors to the national army, agents of the state, enemies, rejecters of constitutional amendments, or boycotters of referendums.

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Media Ads as Links
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Egyptian satellite channel staff confirmed that all channel studios have a representative from the Military Intelligence Communications Department or the Armed Forces Morale Affairs Directorate. It is not surprising, therefore, that the propaganda messages disseminated through mass media correspond to what is said by a specific audience of the army (elderly people and women). However, assuming that the entire propaganda content was prepared in advance, the autonomy and creative ability of media professionals to produce terrorist rhetoric to justify repression and confiscation of freedoms after the explosion of the Dakhaliya Security Agency and before the announcement is significantly reduced. The Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization. A part of the recording of the “Cairo” program circulated on social media networks, in which broadcaster Amr Adeeb appeared, warning of an imminent major terrorist explosion, and in the background, it seems that these words were taught to him from the control room. It is interesting to compare this recording with another one by Adeeb’s wife, broadcaster Lamis Al-Hadidi, who announced the fire of the scientific complex during the cabinet demonstration in 2011 before it actually burned down.

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Skeptics claim that this chaos is the work of BroadCast Unitedligence services that penetrated the street movement. But this may apply to the events of 2011 and 2012, but not to the period after July 3, when the overwhelming political desire of the authorities was to exert order and security influence to appease supporters at home and abroad. The precedent of Mays Al-Hadidi and another of the broadcaster Khairy Ramadan show that the BroadCast Unitedligence industry should focus on specific events. However, combined with some evidence that proves the existence of terrorist organizations, one of which shot down a military helicopter for the first time during the struggle of the Egyptian army with irregular forces, shows that the “terrorist” predictions of Amr Adib are nothing more than a coincidence of his imagination and the imagination of his project team, generated by the transport intensity of this trend, so the “industry” of these organizations agrees, or rather matches and coordinates with the Salafi-jihadists. The “Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis” organization did not initially target any Egyptian political party, and since the beginning of semi-public activities in 2011, it has deviated from the strategic plan of resisting the occupation of the Israeli army and its interests in the Sinai Peninsula. (e.g. blowing up gas export pipelines) as a rebel group against the regime, starting out in conflict with the Egyptian regular army, then quickly engaging in terrorizing civilians, targeting some of them, or holding accountable their presence near security and military headquarters. All of this means that the group’s terrorist acts were not fabricated by BroadCast Unitedligence services, but politically fabricated in the broader context of “terrorism”, with no clear specific consequences. But the celebration of terrorism is internal and latent, in order to be exploited afterwards.

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Egypt seems to be still at the beginning of the slope, and the appointment of a defense minister with the official support of the army will accelerate the decline. When he is primarily responsible for the previous period and everything in it, he will rise militarily and politically, which means escalation for armed groups and more terrorism for society.

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